The last elections (legislative and European) in France have highlighted more than ever the success of populist parties and strategies in French politics, on the left as well as on the right. The aim of this article is to provide a broad overview of the populist situation in French politics, and to understand its causes. This is part of a broader comparative study on the worldwide rise of populism. In this article, we will discuss populism as it is talked about in the mainstream discourse –as opposed to the academic discourse. We will focus on the two most influential parties with populist tendencies in French politics: the far-right Rassemblement National, and the left-wing La France Insoumise. We will provide context as to the current situation, before going into the history of populist tendencies in French politics, in order to understand where the current populist movements take their roots. Then, we will examine the narrative and structure of both parties based on their programmes for the last elections and compare these with the concerns of populist voters. Through this, we hope to understand the attraction of populist parties, based on the subjects that mater to their voters. Finally, we will go into the place of the media in these parties’ strategies, and in their success.
Contents
INTRODUCTION
Populism in the mainstream debate
1 FRENCH POPULISM IN HISTORY
1.1 The beginnings of modern far-right populists.
1.2 The emergence of a populism of the left
2 THE MAIN NARRATIVE OF FRENCH POPULIST PARTIES
2.1 The Rassemblement National
2.2 La France Insoumise
2.3 Elements of comparison
2.4 The concerns of those voting for populist parties
3 POPULISTS IN THE MEDIA: A STORY OF A FABRICATED SUCCESS
3.1 The role of the media in the populist far right’s success
3.2 The role of the private media
3.3 The normalization of the far right and peopolisation of politics
3.4 The erasure and demonization of the left
3.5 LFI‘s use of media
4 CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Yes, if, as I believe, [populism] means defending the forgotten against the elite who have them in a chokehold, then yes, in that case, I am a populist”.
-Marine le Pen, 9.12.2010, France 2
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“I no longer wish to defend myself from the accusation of populism. It is the disgust of the elites – do they deserve better? Let them all go! I call to the energy of the many against the complacency of the privileged. Populist, me? I’ll take it! »
– Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 16.09.2010, interview with l’Express
~~~~
“We are true populists, we are with the people, every day.”
– Macron, 21.11.2018, speech to the mayors of France
INTRODUCTION
In France, the recent European (8th and 9th of June 2024) and legislative (30th of June and 7th of July 2024) elections have displayed a fragmented political spectrum, in which both the biggest far right and far left parties, openly identify as populist …. The above-mentioned quotes are respectively from the leaders of the far-right party RN, far-left party LFI, and centrist (current presidential party) Renaissance.[1] In the European elections, the far-right populist party Rassemblement National came in first, far ahead of others with 31% of the vote, while the runner up, centrist coalition Besoin d’Europe only won 14%.[2] The same day, reacting to these results, president Macron called for a dissolution of the French parliament, expressing concern regarding the rise of the far right, and its anti-Europe positions: « I have decided to give you, again, the choice of our parliamentary future through vote »[3]. Reaffirming his trust in the people, and in democracy, he announced renewed legislative elections to be held less than a month after the European elections. This announcement gave lieu to accelerated campaigns on the part of all parties. The far-right, this time, came in third, with 143 seats, then came the presidential party with 168 seats, and the Nouveau Front Populaire, union of the left, obtained 182 seats -the total of seats to be filled being 577.[4] This assembly, with its absence of a clear majority has steered confusion into the French political scene, as a coalition government is now necessary, but unusual. These elections proved again, the strength of the two main populist movements of the French scene: the RN, and La France Insoumise, a left-wing populist party part of the Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front) alliance.
This situation is not specific to France, as a surge in populism can be observed in several countries around the globe. Although the word populism is becoming increasingly common in political discourse, different actors have different definitions of the concept, the scientific definition -itself controversial- differing greatly from what political actors and the media might mean. This article will attempt to give an overview of occurrences of populism in modern day French politics, to shed light on the causes and characteristics of populist success. This study is part of a larger comparative analysis of populism across multiple countries, aiming to draw connections between the rise of populism in diverse political environments. We will firstly define the concept of populism as used in this article based on what the mainstream discourse refers to as populist. Then, we will go into a historical overview of French populist tendencies leading to the emergence of the modern populist movements. We will further examine the narrative of these parties in the recent elections, examining the « supply »[5] aspect of populism, and later the demand, going into voter concerns and preferences. This will allow us to understand what the driving forces of these populist movements are. Lastly, we will investigate the place of the media in both the left and the right populist’s strategies, as it is a necessary factor to understanding the rise of these movements. Through this analysis, we hope to gain an understanding of the mechanisms of populist movements; the concerns which, in the electorate create a vacuum favourable to populist parties, and the strategies these movements have used, to mobilise a great part of the French electorate.
Populism in the mainstream debate
Populism is present in the two main right and left parties’ rhetoric in France. However, the academic literature tends to avoid giving the far right the qualification of populism, as it has been used and reappropriated by this party since the end of the 20th century, to defend itself against allegations of being an extremist party[6]. Taguieff, for one, introduced this idea while pleading very strongly in favour of the Rassemblement National, insisting upon the idea that it was a populist party, and not a right-wing extremist party. This narrative was later taken on by Marine Le Pen, who went as far as to take to court those who called her party « right-wing extreme ». As this party glides increasingly towards the right-wing extreme, yet tries to present itself as moderate, few still regard it as populist. This qualification is however still relevant in the mainstream discourse (media, press, political speeches etc.). Though not much research has attempted to understand how the word « populism » or « populist » is used in these public spaces. There appears to be no clear definition all actors have agreed upon. Even in the parliamentary arena, when the term is mentioned, it is rarely defined and often left up to individual interpretation.
We can, however, attempt to gather elements of definition based on the occurrence of this term in the media. Populism in the mainstream debate seems to refer to parties featuring:
- a binary opposition between the people –good– and the elite –bad–
- the supremacy of the will of the people, and the populist leader as its utmost representative
- a « thin ideology », providing quick and easy solutions to complex problems
- the use of strong -mostly negative- emotions to create a feeling of community
the two following criteria apply mostly to right-wing populism:
- strong nationalism leading to xenophobic and racist attitudes
- a privileged relationship with the media
In other words, the left- and right-wing populism can be qualified as « inclusionary or exclusionary populism »[7]. The leftist wave attempts to appeal to all people, and to unite various categoriesf the population into one « people », whereas the right has a restrictive approach to those who are considered part of the « people », building this definition mostly on those who are excluded from this group.
1 FRENCH POPULISM IN HISTORY
The French political history is deeply entangled with occurrences of populism. Waves of populism have appeared and disappeared from the end of the 19th century to the end of the 20th. It is only in around the end of the 20th century, that populist parties started to become sustainable.
The Boulangist movement, orbiting around General Boulanger at the end of the 19th century, was one of the first short waves of populism in France. This movement was characterised by a strong anti-republican sentiment (a desire to revise the constitution), and a rallying behind a providential man who alone could save the nation. It targeted and relied on the middle class and workers, with a rhetoric uniting the right and the left, while claiming firmly to belong to neither. Boulanger entered the political arena with a vague programme, based on cherished notions of the motherland and the people, which could be summed up in three words: “Dissolution, Constituency, Revision”. However, the Boulangist movement collapsed as soon as it began to gain importance.
The 20th century witnessed the emergence of two waves of populism that were far more substantial and lasting than their predecessors: the Liguist phenomenon of the 1930s and the rise of the National Front in the 1980s. Both movements shared common features: a protest-driven nature, the exaltation of an activist community united around a charismatic leader, an authoritarian and nationalist rhetoric opposing political, economic, and social liberalism, and a tendency to accept violence in both discourse and political practice. A shared distrust of democratic forms of political mediation also characterised both movements. Furthermore, both arose during times of global economic crisis[8]. After the first World War, several „leagues” appeared on the French political scene. These far-right, anti-parliamentarian political groupings which sought to fight against communism and bolshevism were mainly made up of war veterans. The emergence of these groups is tied to several factors, among which the fast transformations of society, the disappointment and rancour of veterans, the fear of the left and of the growing bolshevism, as well as xenophobic and antisemitic feelings. These concerns did not find any echo in political parties at the time, which caused citizens to organise themselves in new political organisations.
After the Second World War, Pierre Poujade’s brief movement also displayed populist tendencies. This movement focused on opposition to taxes and large institutions, with Poujade portraying himself as a man of the people. He gathered small artisans and shopkeepers, channelling their general resentment towards economic and political elites[9].
1.1 The beginnings of modern far-right populists
Finally, it was in the late 20th century that a populist current emerged in France that has remained to this day. Similarly to what happened during the interwar period, the rise of the National Front (FN), led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, coincided with a global economic crisis—the 1973 oil crisis [10]. The party was founded in 1972, and Jean-Marie Le Pen, formerly part of the Poujadist movement, took its head. The party’s ideology was ultra-nationalist, anti-communist and opposed to immigration. In the aftermath of the Algeria War, the party counted amongst its members several opposers to the independence of Algeria, and former members of the paramilitary group which fought in Algeria (the Organisation Armées Secrète). The FN only began to have electoral success in the 1980s. As unemployment surged and economic insecurity gripped the population, distrust towards the political establishment grew, as it seemed unable to effectively address the crisis. This context allowed the National Front to gain traction with an anti-liberal rhetoric, now more focused on French identity and the perceived loss of traditions and privileges due to immigration. Adopting a Catholic reactionary stance towards the legalisation of abortion, the rise in divorces, the movements of May 1968, and the liberalisation of social norms, the FN had an identity-driven narrative, denouncing moral laxity. This went hand in hand with a strong anti-immigration rhetoric encapsulated in slogans such as “three million immigrants, three million unemployed.” The party remained highly controversial, as JM Le Pen’s xenophobic remarks and inflammatory statements shocked the public – he was convicted for hate speech and slander multiple times -. In the 2002 presidential elections, Le Pen made it to the second round, surprising the electorate. The other candidate, Jacques Chirac, then defeated him, claiming about 80% of the votes. This proved that the French electorate rejected Le Pen’s extremism. In 2011, Marine Le Pen, the daughter of party founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, took over leadership of the party. This marked a strategic shift: where Jean-Marie had embraced the party’s far-right characterisation and often adopted a provocative tone, to stand out and attract by his radicalism, Marine Le Pen sought to moderate the party’s image. Although the FN‘s positions largely remained unchanged, Marine Le Pen strove to present the party as centre-right, or at least more moderate, to appeal to a broader electorate. The party was renamed „Rassemblement National“ (National Rally) to appear less aggressive and frontal. She has so far succeeded in making this party more acceptable to the public. What was considered far-right extremism in the 1980s, is now accepted as simply right wing. This shift fits into a broader trend in French politics, in which the landscape has gradually shifted towards the right, and is due not only to Marine Le Pen and the media‘s efforts, -which we will address later on-, but also to the emergence of the even more extremist party „Reconquête“ (Recapture), led by Eric Zemmour, which created a new standard for extremism, and normalised the RN‘s position. This « moderation » of the party, has succeeded in securing the FN a much larger electorate, placing Marine Le Pen in the second round of Presidential elections several times in a row, in 2017 and in 2022.
As we have mentioned, the populist movements in French history have been associated with the far right. From the Boulangist movement to the creation of Front National, these movements and parties have had an anti-liberal, sometimes anti-parliamentarian, and most times xenophobic rhetoric. The left wing of French politics did not experience significant populism until much later.
1.2 The emergence of a populism of the left
The two main leftist parties in French 20th century politics were the French Communist Party (PCF), and later the Socialist Party (PS). These have traditionally been remarkably close to the working class and to social movements. While some populist elements are to be found in their rhetoric, for example in the Communist Party’s strong positioning of the workers against the bourgeois elite, these are not generally referred to as populist parties. As the left began to lose influence towards the end of the 20th century, a vacuum appeared which allowed the FN to gain momentum. Many left-wing politicians left the socialist party which at the time was taking a neo-liberal turn[11]. In the beginning of the 21st century, Jean Luc Mélenchon, former member of the PS appeared as the main figure of an emerging leftist populist current. Over the years (2005 to 2016), Mélenchon consecutively created and then abandoned more than 5 parties and political movements aiming at creating a « new left ». The last in date, and most successful, is La France Insoumise (Unsubmissive France). Founded is 2016, LFI is in its own words a « citizen’s movement », and not a political party, although it has all the characteristics of one[12]. This is explained by a general distrust of French citizens in political parties (according to a study by CEVIPOF, more than 80% of French people do not trust political parties, as they are seen as outdated, bureaucratic institutions which block the political landscape in an unsatisfactory status quo.)
The creation of LFI was inspired by other European left-wing populist movements such as Podemos (Spain), and Syriza (Greece), aiming to mobilise the « people » against the political and economic elite. The movement focused on economic justice, environmentalism, and direct democracy. Mélenchon submitted his candidacy in the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections to « the people », as he announced on national television, that he would participate if he gathered at least 150 000 citizen’s signatures on his internet platform. This procedure was thought out as an alternative to the usual 500 sponsorships from elected representatives a candidate legally must gather to run for president. This a first example of the movement’s tendency towards direct democracy, and the populist characteristic of bypassing democratic institutions, putting the will of the people above all else. In this election, Mélenchon received about 20% of the votes, an impressive number (doubling since his last campaign in 2012), but not enough to get him to run in the second round. LFI also became part of the parliamentary opposition to Emmanuel Macron in the following legislative elections, where it opposed the neoliberal, privatisation policies of the government, rejecting deregulation of labour protection. In the 2022 presidential elections, Mélenchon obtained the same score, placing third, and the following legislative elections saw the left unite into a New Ecological and Social People’s Union, which performed very well. However, this union proved unable to last, and a new union emerged in the 2024 legislative elections, the Nouveau Front Populaire.
Having a look at LFI’s internal workings, Manuel Cervez notices that the party is organised in a highly hierarchic manner, with Mélenchon being the „key“ („je suis la clé de voute“[13]). Moreover, he points out that intermediaries inside of the party have slowly disappeared, in favour of a direct relation between the leader and the activists. Through this process, the movement became more centralised, and activists were dispossessed of the decision power that they would normally have inside a party. In addition to this, this party uses social media as one of its main communication platforms. One shows support by sharing or liking the party’s content. This form of participation in the movement has gradually taken more importance. The activists have been dispossessed of the physical decision power. This has two effects: on the one hand, some activists are demotivated, by seeing their influence and power reduced, and therefore leave the movement. On the other hand, by reducing the power and activities of activists, the line between member and sympathiser is blurred, creating a less involved, but more massive support base.
This new leftist populist party differs from the previous leftist parties by its use of the media, which allows them to reach a younger audience, the intense links it has to social movements, the attempt to conciliate the demands of the workers and the middle class, and a top-down dynamic in which the movement uses social movements to support itself when it needs it, whereas the parties used to be born out of social movements, in a bottom-up approach.
It remains to this day, the most important left-wing force of the French political scene, although the importance of its leader in the party has been a point of intense criticism.
2 THE MAIN NARRATIVE OF FRENCH POPULIST PARTIES
We will investigate what the main narrative of populism in both for the right and left parties separately, as they differ significantly. Elements of comparison will be provided at the end of this analysis, as well as an overview of voter ‘s concerns. The elements from this analysis are mostly drawn from the parties’ campaigns and programs for the 2024 legislative elections, and European elections.
2.1 The Rassemblement National
In regards to the RN, it is worth noting that the party not only changed names shortly before the 2024 elections, but that its main figure, Marine le Pen, who had been at the head of the party, and the spotlight candidate in all elections so far, has been replaced by another, candidate: Jordan Bardella. Bardella is a much younger candidate that Marine Le Pen, who’s following among younger people and on social media is impressive, and who gave a new face to this party. In the legislative elections, the RN formed a political alliance with another, less successful right-wing party: „Les Républicains“
Through its campaign, the RN has defined three main emergencies, or threats, which they would tend to as soon as elected: quality of life, security and immigration (citer programme législatives). These three themes are the skeleton of the RN’s narrative.
Under quality of life, the RN intends to defend purchasing power and fight economic precarity. This is based on a critic of former governments for favouring globalisation at the expense of the middle and working class. The party advocates a form of economic protectionism, often also criticising European economic measures. The proposed policies are aimed at the French middle and lower working class, as well as at rural and peri-urban areas, which are referred to by the party as the „forgotten France“.
The RN also places emphasis on insecurity (crime and delinquency), claiming this is mostly due to laxist immigration policies. They support a law reinforcement, targeting young delinquents with a history of migration (a suspension of social benefits for families of young delinquents), and an increase in police force. This aspect is also linked to fighting against Islamist terrorism, and what the RN calls zones of „non-law“(„zones de non-droit“); places where the law is apparently not respected. This refers mainly to suburban, very poor areas, populated by people of migratory descent.
The issue of immigration is the central theme of the RN‘s discourse, who strongly criticises French and European immigration policies. The party accuses current immigration policies of being massively out of control and threatening the country‘s social cohesion and cultural identity. They advocate a drastic reduction of migration through „national priority“ policies, in which French nationals would have a priority over non-French inhabitants in obtaining social benefits (regarding unemployment, housing, et cetera). This is based on the idea, that migrants come to France solely to profit from social benefits. It would go hand in hand with a strengthening of border controls, tougher residency requirements, and easier expulsion for delinquent immigrants.
The party systematically presents immigration as a threat to French stability and security. Important is that the right benefits here from a good relationship with some of the biggest French private media channels, which play a significant role in spreading news and messages which feed its narrative. It is no coincidence that the RN‘s programme for the legislative elections mentions the privatisation of public broadcasting. This measure is presented as necessary in order to reduce the national debt. It raises questions, though, regarding the relationship of RN politicians with the big owners of private medias[14].
Additionally, the RN has explicitly expressed the wish to rule through referendums, to better understand and cater to the needs of the people[15]. This echoes a tendency to bypass democratic institutions too, putting the “will of the people” above all else. Moreover, this party systematically denigrates left-wing and centrist actors – all those who are not part of their party – and blames them for endangering France through inappropriate policies.
2.2 La France Insoumise:
La France Insoumise (LFI) is the most successful left-wing party in France. In the recent elections it ran in the „Nouveau Front Populaire“ (NFP) alliance, together with some other, smaller, leftist and ecologist parties. Their programme and campaign are therefore not an exact reflection of the party itself. The LFI is by far the biggest and most influential party in this coalition, though. Therefore, its part in developing the programme of the „Nouveau Front Populaire“ was big enough to take it as a starting point of this analysis.
The LFI‘s (or NFP‘s) campaign is an example of inclusive populism. The party has done its best to represent in its campaign, programs, posters etc. a remarkably diverse population in terms of age, origins, professional activity, etc.[16] The call to the people remains, as well as the exaltation of the working class, but no one is explicitly excluded from this people, apart maybe, the economic and political elite. The NFP‘s ideology is rooted in social issues. As all social movements[17], this unions portrays itself as the intermediary between these movements and the government, capable of making the movement‘s claims heard, and transforming them into policies. The party supports these social movements, but is never the main actor of uprisings, protests, etc. It only claims to stand by and forward their demands. The NFP‘s program can therefore be read in parallel with recent movements of protests in France. In its emergency measures, the programme mentions for example decreeing a state of „social emergency“, in which the price of essential goods would be frozen, as well as of energy and fuel (an answer to the „Yellow vest“ movement of 2018). Besides, the age of retirement would not change (an answer to the protests against the retirement reform of 2023), the minimal wage would rise, and a minimum price for farmers would be guaranteed and the super-profits of agro-industries and supermarkets would be taxed (an answer to the farmer‘s protests 2024)[18]. Moreover, on environmental issues, the party promises to stop all major motorway infrastructure projects (an answer to the ongoing protests against the building of the new A69 motorway), as well as all „mega-basins“ projects, which are also a cause of environmental protest. Some further focus points are improving social services, especially in the health sector, as well as in the education sector. Interestingly, in the recent elections, the LFI as part of the NFP has had a much less leader-centred approach as it has on its own. This shows a will to compromise and integrate into the leftist political landscape. Compromising with the right, however, is still a no-go, as we could observe in their refusal to take part in a government under right-wing prime minister Michel Barnier.
It is interesting to take a look at the inner workings of this movement, which has been harshly criticised for not being democratic. As LFI claims to be a movement, rather than a party, it has no clear structure or organisation. There is no procedure for decision making within in the party, as it claims to function organically, as a flexible movement. Mélenchon describes the movement as « gaseous », refusing to categorise its dynamic in the binary « horizontal » or « vertical ». This flexibility, supposed to be the party’s strength, results in very little internal democracy, some of its members claim. A document was published in 2019 by 40 party executives, suggesting to « Rethink the workings of LFI », as they noticed a « weakening of the activist network and the departure of several leaders » mainly due to the way the party operates. The organic and flexible structure appears to generate a concentration of power in the hands of a few people. Measures have been taken by the party to reverse this trend, implementing new assemblies to encourage dialogue between activists. However, these seem not to have been very efficient in resolving the issues.
2.3 Elements of comparison
The LFI‘s claims and ideas are significantly less simple than those of the RN, covering more issues and going into more detail in its electoral programme, as well as in its general discourse.
Both parties lend great importance to improving the health and education system. Both appeal to the working class, and people in precarious situations, although one is more inclusive than the other.
Both parties are in favour of a more frequent use of referendums, the NFP even putting forwards reforms to implement a “Référendum d‘initiative citoyenne“ and a “référendum d‘inititiative partagée“ (two types of bottom-up referendums for legislation propositions)
These claims all feed into a common vision of emergency, the lexicon of crises being very present in both parties‘ rhetoric. They insist that the current, centrist-right government has led the country to this crisis. For the RN, the crisis is mostly due to immigration. For the NFP its biggest symptom is the increase in popularity of the right-wing extremism.
In addition, both have a clear stance on the matter of Islam in France. While the RN plans on passing a law to restrict Islamist ideologies which are viewed as an authoritarian threat, the NFP promises to fight racism and islamophobia. It is also interesting to notice that the NFP‘s programme includes specific policies to overseas regions, while these do not appear in the RN‘s discourse.
The elements which these parties have in common, are those which make them populist: an opposition between the people and the elite, the wish for more direct democracy, and an appeal to the people through promises of better social benefits. They also have in common a narrative of emergency, of an ongoing crisis caused by the political forces in power, which only the party would be able to address. However, they differ greatly on the matters of immigration and Islam,. The RN builds its narrative on fear of foreigners and of the outside world, while the LFI builds its following on addressing the causes of social movements.
Looking at the concerns of those voting for populist parties might help determine, which aspect of these programs speak to the voters.
2.4 The concerns of those voting for populist parties
The rise of populism is a global phenomenon, with several factors common across various contexts[19]. One key factor is the increase of multiculturalism, which has led to a perceived erosion of cultural and political identities, creating anxiety among certain segments of the population. This anxiety often predisposes individuals to adhere to identity politics and xenophobic narratives. Right-wing populists frequently capitalise on this narrative, criticising the left for allegedly abandoning the “people” through multicultural policies. This sets the stage for a conservative, anti-immigration stance, which presents itself as a defence of national identity against external threats.
Certainly in France, another significant factor contributing to the rise of populism is the general economic decline experienced by the working and middle classes. As inflation rises while wages stagnate, discontent grows among the population, often manifesting in series of protests. This causes a general distress of the population, fuelling a demand for either a scapegoat or for more effective state intervention in the economic and social spheres. The need for better social services, and more affordable living conditions is addressed by both the LFI and RN, who, as mentioned above, also simplistically both blame the current government for these issues. But the RN goes further by using anti-immigration rhetoric to frame immigrants and asylum seekers as the cause of economic hardships, claiming that immigrants are taking the French’s jobs, or that they are abusing social benefits.
According to a study by Fondapol[20], the most pressing concerns for a significant portion of the population are unemployment and social inequality. A majority of those who prioritise these issues tend to support left-wing populist or revolutionary parties. The third most urgent concern is immigration, which resonates more with right-wing voters. However, it is noteworthy that a considerable number of left-wing voters also express concerns about immigration, indicating the cross-cutting nature of this issue.
These findings align with other studies on populism and voting behaviour, showing that populist voters often believe in the need for greater authority, national unity, and a stronger national executive[21]. There is also a prevalent belief among populist voters that immigration weakens France’s culture, economy, and social society. Additionally, cultural traditionalism — opposition to LGBTQ+ rights, gay marriage, and a desire to preserve traditional family values — alongside calls for better wealth redistribution, emerge as key factors.
For left-wing populist voters, the primary concerns revolve around wealth distribution and social justice, which are the main themes addressed by LFI. Right-wing populist voters, however, are more motivated by the anti-immigration and authoritarian stances spread by the RN. In essence, the populist vote in France is a clear expression of protest. Whether it represents social protest on the left or identity politics on the right, both forms of populism reflect deep dissatisfaction with the status quo and a desire for radical change.
An analysis of the RN and LFI‘s programs and their voters shows that their success is rooted in a felt ongoing crisis. They build their following on similar themes of emergency, crisis, and danger, although their opinions about the causes and solutions to this crisis differ greatly. The left-wing populists tend to encourage and advocate for social movements, addressing the themes that the people themselves bring awareness to. In this way, they carry the concerns voiced by the people through protests, into the parliamentary arena. The right, however, gives an explanation of the crisis itself: migration. The presence of immigrants in France is presented as a threat to the French economy, the social system, public safety, etc.. This justifies that migration is the focal point of its programme. Both these narratives find an echo in the population: as the people are faced with an economic, political and environmental crisis, some find an answer in specific measures towards a better-functioning welfare state, and some find a sufficient scapegoat in immigration. However, these opinions are not clearly separated in a right-left spectrum in the population. The migration narrative does find some echo among leftist voters, and social concerns among those of the right.
3 POPULISTS IN THE MEDIA: A STORY OF A FABRICATED SUCCESS
As discussed earlier, the rise of populism in France can be partially attributed to an identity crisis and increasing economic precarity. However, one of the most significant factors explaining the rise and dynamics of populism – especially right-wing populism – in France is the role of the media. Far-right parties, particularly the Rassemblement National (RN), receive disproportionately high levels of media exposure across television, radio, print, and digital outlets compared to left-wing and centrist parties. In this section, we will give an overview of the presence of these parties in the media. This section focuses mostly on the RN‘s ties to traditional media – TV, press, radio -, as we believe this aspect, which is relatively specific to the French political scene, to be of utmost importance when trying to understand the dynamics of populism in France. Indeed, while right-wing populist parties are overly present and influential on social media platforms all over the world, the ties of the French right-wing to the traditional media are one of a kind.
3.1 The role of the media in the populist far right’s success
In the lead-up to the 2024 European elections, RN candidate Jordan Bardella was mentioned 24,188 times in the media (television, press, and radio) between May 1 and June 7, 2024. In contrast, his main opponent, Raphaël Glucksmann, received approximately 16,500 mentions, while other candidates garnered around 8,000 mentions.[22] This imbalance in media representation is linked to the fact that major French media outlets are not neutral and, some of them being private, often serve private interests, which tend to favour right-wing political perspectives. Consequently, right-wing views are more frequently represented and normalised through a diluted form of political journalism. In contrast, leftist parties and social movements are often marginalised, demonised, or dismissed. This media bias amplifies the visibility of right-wing populism, contributing to its broader acceptance and mainstreaming within French political discourse.
3.2 The role of the private media
The French media arena is largely owned by private actors. The biggest private actor of this sector is the Bolloré family (under Vincent Bolloré’s leadership), which owns the TV channels Journal du Dimanche, C8, Canal+, CNews, Europe1 and RFM, and a number of others, as well as radio channels, written press, publishing labels and polling institutes. A considerable number of other media are privately owned (the most important being Le Parisien, Le Figaro, L’Express and BFM-TV). There remains a good number of public TV channels, but existing in the same arena as the privately owned ones, they are not free of their influence. The ARCOM (regulatory authority for television and digital communication), ACRIMED (critical media observatory), and many journalists have warned against the concentration of the press in the hands of private actors, and the threats this poses to a free and reliable media space.[23] The medias mentioned above which are partly or totally under the control of the Bolloré family are some of the most viewed or read, and some of the most important in providing the far-right the media platform which has made it so successful. The influence of these medias also extends to public channels and influence the entire media sphere.
Vincent Bolloré himself, even though he claims not to influence his medias with his beliefs (he is a self-proclaimed Christian-conservative), has reportedly met with, and influenced the political leaders of the RN, and LR[24]. He also reshapes the medias he acquires, changing the names, journalists, dynamics and themes. The result of this is on the one hand revisionist, conservative media, which prosper on the basis of far right, racist editorials, and on the other hand an authoritarian internal management, with a cost-reduction policy. For example, CNRS researcher Claire Ségail[25] reported that more than half of the time (53%) reserved for political journalism on the famous „TPMP“ talk show was dedicated to inviting far-right party members, while only 22% was dedicated to the presidential majority, and 7% to the left. Of the 53% of news time it dedicated to the far right, 47% went to the leader of the right-extremist party Reconquête: Eric Zemmour. Similarly, on the Europe 1 radio channel, in the section „La grande Interview“ 71 of the 75 people featured between August and December 2023 were of ultra-revisionist and conservative opinions (this includes politicians, journalists, experts etc.). These two channels are owned and influenced by Bolloré, and similar trends go for all of the other shows airing on the Bolloré – and other – privately owned channels (CNews, Europe 1, RFM). In addition, these news-oriented channels systematically use right-wing conservative framing in their journalism, presenting news in a spectacular and alarmist way.
Moreover, the cost-reduction policy led in many outlets to less investigative journalism and more on-sided journalism. While the work conditions of the media employees decline, so does the quality of their journalism. Channels like CNews, which used to feature mostly on-site investigation, are now mostly dedicated to inviting personalities and discussing events. ACRIMED warns against these channel‘s habit of routinisation of information[26], systematically putting forwards the same type of information: alarmist magazine and article titles, pre-made and stigmatising investigations about peri-urban areas, discussion panels, and over-use of the „endangered secularism“ narrative.
The tendency of the private media to adopt a right-wing perspective, combined with the decline of the quality of the journalism it features, have an influence on the entire mediatic sphere. As public and private media coexist in the same space, public media also has to compete for the attention of viewers by using the same mechanisms as the private channels. By forwarding the messages, and themes treated by these high-audience private channels, public media also contributes to bringing more attention and credibility to these conservative revisionist ideas.
The themes that are most recurrent on these right-wing sympathising channels, are those of security, and immigration. These have been pushed into the French media for decades by the same outlets, eventually being taken on also by public media. The tendency to spectacular, shocking and radical discourse of the far right is very successful in attracting attention in the media, and right-wing personalities are much more often invited to react or give their opinions on current events on all media types and outlets, since they guarantee more audience.
For example, in 2021, in the week following the assassination of teacher Samuel Paty by an Islamist terrorist, the morning emissions of 11 of the biggest TV and radio channels hosted 9 conservative/revisionist political guests out of 10. In this case, this was the case in all media, private, public, and independent: out of le Parisien, Le Monde, Le Figaro and Libération (generally regarded as more „trustworthy“ and „independent“ medias), not one invited a political guest from LFI or the other leftist parties. This of course creates perfect ground for the spreading of an Islamophobic, anti-immigration, nationalist discourse, as only the „solutions“ and „reactions“ of the far-right to this situation are given an audience.
Thus, the private ownership of many French media channels has an influence on the information these media spread, as well as on the themes, their framing, and the quality of the journalism. The public media are also influenced by the themes pushed forwards by private media: they also tend to favour right-wing perspectives and guests as these guarantee more audience.
3.3 The normalization of the far right and peopolisation of politics
A further consequence of the excessive presence of this type of biased journalism, is the normalisation of revisionist extremes. Through a sort of „peopolisation“ of the political candidates[27], these medias manage to divert their audiences’ attention from their political views to their personal hobbies and traits. A reassuring, positive image of the politician is created.
This has been remarkably successful for Marine le Pen, who, as mentioned previously, has succeeded to seem more „moderate“. There have been countless documentaries and TV shows about the Le Pen family, their personal life, ambitions, etc., and general information that is totally unrelated to their political activities. Marine Le Pen‘s love for cats turned out to be a very important subject during her campaign for the 2022 presidential elections, the subject coming up in several interviews on TV and news headlines. She even got asked on an RMC direct channel, where she was invited to talk about her presidential campaign, whwther she would bring her six cats when moving into the presidential residence. Jordan Bardella received the same treatment, several interviews and articles putting forward his love for Italian pasta – the relevance of which to his political campaign remains unknown.
“Marine Le Pen is no longer the representative of the far-right family in the eyes of the French. She’s become, I’m not going to say a sort of auntie who gives out kisses but there’s a bit of that.”
– Brice Teinturier, Ipsos Institute, in „C‘est dans l‘air“, France 5, 11.04.2022
“Today marine le Pen is the candidate of cats, and purchasing power”.
-Jean-Michel Aphatie, France 2, 02.04.2022, live OEED
This portrayal of political figures as celebrities has succeeded in making them more popular among the population. It contributes to making right-wing extremists seem less extreme, and more acceptable.
This peopolisation of politicians goes hand in hand with a tendency for journalists to abstain from contradicting, or questioning politicians on air. This turned political debate spaces into rooms for expression and campaign. France inter‘s (public media) news director, notably publicly congratulated two of her journalists for not having contradicted, argued with or reacted to Eric Zemmour’s (leader of the extremist party Reconquête) intervention on their morning show[28]. Additionally, journalists have been fired, for questioning Jordan Bardella and other personalities’ discourse too much, while on air[29].
All this amounts to a significant impoverishment of the public debate, which not only slides towards non-political themes, but also lacks the deliberation necessary to develop informed political opinions.
3.4 The erasure and demonization of the left
Finally, a significant element in the media’s role in the rise of right-wing populists, is the erasure, and demonization of the left. In addition to denying leftist perspectives a place in their programs, private medias also tend to have a narrative which completely invalidates the left. Leftist points of views, measures and initiatives are portrayed as impossible, or as only capable of bringing chaos, ruin, and more crises. This invalidation of leftist standpoints occurs systematically and without debate.
Right-wing medias have a habit of depicting the left as increasingly extreme and irrational. Terms such as « eco-terrorists », or « islamo–leftist » are used on a regular basis to refer to leftist parties and politicians. While the left is depicted advocating the Islamist authoritarianism the right fears, the narrative of hate, and racism is completely flipped around: LFI becomes the party of hate, exclusion and racism, and the RN fights for unity and inclusion.
This allows the RN to seize political themes that have been traditionally mostly treated by the left (arguing for better social services, more unity and tolerance in the country etc.), and manage to present them, as having always been part of the far-right’s ideology. This explains, why the RN can present itself as an « anti-system », « alternative » party, when it really is none of the two. It manages to combine this anti-system rhetoric with advocating a neo-liberal world view, and by invalidating any alternatives. The social protests, and anti-racist claims upon which the LFI builds a lot of its rhetoric are constantly invalidated by these far-right media outlets, claiming that they are only bringing chaos, and that the measures they are protesting are inevitable. By depicting social injustice as a fatality, these news outlets invalidate these protests. The protests against the retirement system reform initiated by Macron’s government are a good example of this appropriation. Reporting on these matters, headlines read slogans such as « Retirement: reform or chaos? » « Retirement: reform or ruin », « Retirement: we don’t have a choice».[30] At the same time, this press managed to paint Marine le Pen as the « main actor » of these protests, which widened her electorate, although she and her party did not contribute either to the protest movement, or to the parliamentary work that led to it.[31]
“LFI and Jean Luc Mélenchon, who based their campaign solely on the fact of antisemitism, hatred, and detestation of the other, are making a popular front?”
Perrine Simon-Nahum, CCesoir, France 5, 10.06.2024
“I say to JL Mélenchon, who has become France’s leading imam: shut your big mouth!”
Gerard Larcher, RMC, 06.12.2023
By portraying the left as irrational and dangerous, these medias succeed in completely invalidating leftist points of views. Once again, the place for deliberation and debate in the media is significantly reduced, leaving space for the dramatic statements of the right. This mechanism is particularly adapted by right-wing populist parties: having an overly simplified narrative, they refuse to engage in public debate, and instead focus on criticising other political actors, blaming them for the current situation.
3.5 La France Insoumise’s use of media
The overbearing presence of the right in traditional as well as social media, has pushed the left to develop its own medias, and to find different ways to reach out to and to communicate with its voters. The party is also very active on social media and manages in this way to engage with a wide, and young audience. It has a diverse ecosystem of medias to spread its ideas including a website, an app, a newspaper in addition to social media, although it comes nowhere close to being as present as the right in traditional medias.
LFI’s YouTube channel is the most followed French political channel and has evolved over the years to adapt to the short form punchy content which is favoured on social media. This channel offers replays of all of Mélenchon’s appearances on Television and radio, as well as « Weekly reviews », where weekly world news is analysed and summarised. Mélenchon also communicates a lot through twitter, where he can keep his supporter base informed of all his whereabouts. The party’s app offers tailored news, presented from a leftist perspective, and focused on the subjects which are central to the party, access to all appearances of LFI on television and other media, and a donation platform.
LFI’s use of the media shows that they are in a position where developing their own media is crucial, in order to be heard. Because the party has more control over the things it can post on its own online platforms than on traditional media outlets, this is their favoured means of communication. Political scientist Antoine Bristielle mentions[32], that online interviews and news tend to address more fundamental political themes, than the traditional media (tv/radio/newspapers) who focus more on the political « game ». This is also a way to embody the party’s claim towards more « direct democracy », by being more on social media, and in touch with its supporters and activists, the party gives the impression to be very democratic. This, however, has turned out to be only a façade. Not only are supporters constrained to very little possibilities of reaction (and not action) on social media, but this also reflects the the inner workings of the party as well. Notably, Mélenchon is almost exclusively the focus of these medias, confirming his position as leader of the party.
Through the sympathy and political involvement of the owners of the biggest French private medias, the right has managed to boost its popularity. It is overly represented in the media (private, as well as public), which contributes to the right-wing narrative appearing more moderate: when it‘s the only thing one hears or sees on TV, then it has to be the norm (and not an extremist standpoint). Moreover, the decrease of the quality of journalism in private media combined with the „peopolisation“ of politicians get in the way of a free political debate. This, in combination with binary, fatalist narratives which dismiss leftist standpoints and often refuse to argue with them contributes to the impoverishment of the political debate. Moreover, the far-right populists also have an advantage on social media, as controversial, virulent statements generate the most visibility and engagement on these platforms. It is by far the political movement with the biggest following on social media, which allows it to reach particularly young audiences. As a result, the RN appears as more moderate party, with a presidential candidate who would be „like a mother“ to the country if elected president. The way right wing populists make use of the media, is a reflection of the populist tendency of the party: the tendency to focus on „personalities“ embodying the party – the populist leader -, rather than on the party‘s ideas. Similarly, the way these medias favour the right through dramatic and simplified headlines and claims, while not featuring opposing viewpoints results in a simplification of the political debate, in which the other parties are dismissed instead of discussed. The leftist party‘s mediatic presence is more similar to that of other foreign political parties: its form as a „movement“ being only possible through the existence of social media platforms where the leader can be in touch with its voters. The left‘s presence in traditional media is significantly smaller than that of the right, leading it to develop its own platforms to spread its ideas and news. All in all, the right has an overbearing – and typically populist – presence in the French media, which is a very important factor to the success of the party.
4 CONCLUSIONS
French politics have been witnessing populist tendencies since at least the 19th century. But the struggle for a definition remains. In this article, we decided to examine political actors based on a definition picked out of the mainstream debate: populist actors feature a binary opposition between the people and the elite, have a strong leader which embodies the supreme will of the people, a tendency to simplify complex problems, and the use of strong emotions in their rhetoric. Two actors and their parties stood out as matching this definition: the left-wing LFI, and the far-right RN. We also decided to analyse the relationship populist actors have with the media, to shed light on some of the factors of their success.
Firstly, we established that populist tendencies have existed for a long time in the French political landscape but have only crystallised themselves into substantial political movements at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Two currents of populism then emerged: on the right-wing, an exclusive current rooted in anti-immigration, conservative rhetoric and polemic interventions, and on the left, a movement traditionally closer to socialism and rooted in social issues. Some similarities are to be found in the ideas defended by both parties, such as appealing to the working class, promising to improve health and education systems, favouring more democracy, and spreading a feeling of crisis and urgency to strengthen their narrative. Nevertheless, they strongly differ on the issues of immigration, national security, and environmental policies.
Studies on populist voter’s concerns show that the parties’ projects correspond very well to the population’s complaints, highlighting on both sides of the political spectrum, a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, and a desire for radical change. Moreover, the inner workings of the left-wing populist party LFI reveal a highly hierarchic dynamic, which causes deep dissatisfaction to some of its members. True to the populist ways, the head of the party J-L Mélenchon seems to have crystallised all the decision power around him. We did not have information on the same subjects regarding the RN, this was therefore not treated in this article.
Diving into the mediatic exposure and strategies of these two parties, we noticed that the far-right‘s affiliations with private owned press has been a key element to their electoral success. This has allowed the party to gain exposure, and therefore popularity, as they are invited significantly more in the traditional medias than the left. This complicity with the media has succeeded in making the party appear more moderate than it did in the past, while disregarding the left, and portraying it as the feared extreme the far right used to be seen as. To compensate for this, the left-wing party has also developed medias which are linked to the party – though much inferior in scale to those of the far right -, and has relied on a very wide support base mobilised through social movements.
The two parties discussed in this article have been the main populist actors of the French political scene for the last decade. While they are regularly criticized by voters and members, they have well proven their ability to mobilise citizens and to influence the political game. This not only through political ideology, but also through their abilities to exploit social anxieties and to dominate public discourse.
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Notes
[1] Cervera-Marzal, Le populisme de gauche
[2] “Résultats des élections européennes 2024 | France | Parlement européen.” Accessed December 4, 2024. https://results.election.europa.eu/fr/france/.
[3] « J’ai décidé de vous redonner le choix de notre avenir parlementaire par le vote », https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/294547-emmanuel-macron-09062024-dissolution-de-lassemblee-nationale, Accessed November 3, 2024
[4] “La carte des résultats des législatives 2024 au second tour : la composition de l’Assemblée et le député élu dans votre circonscription.”, Le Monde, July 8, 2024.
[5] Laclau, Ernesto, and Jean-Pierre Ricard. La raison populiste. L’ordre philosophique. Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 2008. and Mouffe, Chantal, and Pauline Colonna d’Istria. Pour un populisme de gauche. Paris: Albin Michel, 2018.
[6] Pierre-André Taguieff, L’Illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l’âge démocratique,
Flammarion, Paris, 2007., in Cervera-Marzal, Manuel. Le populisme de gauche: sociologie de la France insoumise, Chap 8 : Un populisme de gauche à l‘européenne. Paris: la Découverte, 2021
[7] Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America.” Government and Opposition 48, no. 2 (April 2013): 147–74.
[8] Bernard, Mathias. “Des années 1930 aux années 1980 : invariants et mutations du populisme à la française.” Cités 49, no. 1 (April 16, 2012).
[9] Dosquet, Bertrand Augé, Frédéric. “Boulangisme et Poujadisme : Deux Nuances Du Populisme En France – Un Parallèle Avec La Situation d’aujourd’hui ?,” July 9, 2024.
[10] Bernard, Mathias. “Des années 1930 aux années 1980 : invariants et mutations du populisme à la française.” Cités 49, no. 1 (April 16, 2012).
[11] François Delapierre, Quelle histoire ! Chroniques du Front de gauche, Bruno Leprince, Paris, 2012, p. 41
[12] Cervera-Marzal, Manuel. Le populisme de gauche: sociologie de la France insoumise. Paris: la Découverte, 2021.
[13] JL mélenchon“ Entretien avec Julien Brisson et Vincent Martigny dans la revue Le 1, n° 174, 18 octobre 2017.
[14] Le Monde.fr. “Comment Eric Ciotti a Orchestré Avec Vincent Bolloré l’annonce de Son Ralliement Au RN.” June 13, 2024.
[15] „donner la parole aux Français par référendum » sur ce sujet. Au JT de 20H de TF1, lundi 10 juin 2024, Marine Le Pen confirmait la volonté de son parti de proposer un référendum dès qu’il le pourrait
[16] La France insoumise. Nous Sommes La France – Le Clip Officiel Du Nouveau Front Populaire, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EuorOkihNGU.
[17] Cervera-Marzal, Manuel. Le populisme de gauche: sociologie de la France insoumise. Paris: la Découverte, 2021.
[18] Contrat de législature du Nouveau Front Populaire, https://lafranceinsoumise.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Programme-nouveaufrontpopulaire.pdf
[19] Gilles Ivaldi. Populism in France. Daniel Stockemer. Populism Around the World. A Comparative Perspective, Springer, pp.27-48, 2018
[20] Reynié, Dominique. 2022, le risque populiste en France: un indicateur de la protestation électorale. Paris: Fondation pour l’innovation politique, 2019.
[21] Ivaldi, Gilles. “Populisme et choix électoral. Analyse des effets des attitudes populistes sur l’orientation du vote.” Revue française de science politique 68, no. 5 (October 9, 2018): 847–72.
[22] BOISSELIER, Alexis. “Élections Européennes : Quels Candidats Ont Été Les plus Exposés Dans Les Médias ?,” June 10, 2024.
[23] Jérémie Fabre and Marie Beyer. “Médias Français : Qui Possède Quoi ?” ACRIMED, December 11, 2023.
[24] Le Monde.fr. “Comment Eric Ciotti a Orchestré Avec Vincent Bolloré l’annonce de Son Ralliement Au RN.” June 13, 2024.
[25] Sécail, Claire. Touche pas à mon peuple. Libelle. Paris: Seuil, 2024.
[26] Benjamin Ferron and Jean-Baptiste Comby. “La Subordination Du Journalisme Au Pouvoir Économique.” ACRIMED, February 12, 2019.
[27] BLAST, Le souffle de l’info. ASCENSION DE L’EXTRÊME DROITE : LES MÉDIAS COMPLICES ET COUPABLES, 2024.
[28] Catherine Nayl on France Inter, 25.02.2022
[29] “Après avoir interviewé Jordan Bardella, une journaliste de RCI Guadeloupe privée d’antenne – L’Humanité,” December 11, 2023., and Barbara Olivier-Zandronis, Arrêt sur images, 12.12.2023
[30] „Retraites, on n’a pas le choix…“- L’info du vrai, „Retraites, la réforme ou la ruine?“ -LCI, „Retraites, la réforme ou le chaos“-LCI
[31]BLAST, Le souffle de l’info. ASCENSION DE L’EXTRÊME DROITE : LES MÉDIAS COMPLICES ET COUPABLES, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2XCAqazClY.
[32] Bristielle, Antoine. “YouTube comme média politique : les différences de contenu entre interviews politiques classiques et émissions en ligne de trois représentants de La France insoumise.” Mots. Les langages du politique 123, no. 2 (July 6, 2020): 103–21.