Populism in the Netherlands: tradition or trend?

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Populism defined

A common definition of populism given by Cas Mudde entails the following: ‘[populism is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Additionally, Mudde describes populism as a thin ideology, which is to say that it can be applied to another bigger ideology, such as nationalism (Mudde, 2004).

Using this definition of populism, several parties from the present and the past can be regarded as populist. Though we have seen populism before in the Netherlands, it has not come to a point before where a populist party was part of a coalition, let alone its leading party. Until before the end of the previous century, Dutch society was characterized by four pillars: Catholics, Protestants, liberals, and socialists. In practice, this meant that the social lives of people were strongly determined by the pillar they grew up in. It was only natural for citizens to vote for politicians within their pillar, therefore, there was simply no room for populists in the political field. As the pillars started to break down in the second half of the 20th century, more exchange between citizens from different pillars became possible (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012).

As this exchange became possible and individual desires became more important, one would think that the de-pillarization revealed a suitable breeding ground for populism. However, a rise in populism was practically nowhere to be seen. Populist movements in the 90s, such as the Centrum Party or the Centrum Democrats evaporated quickly. Similarly, in the early 2000s, right-wing parties with populist tendencies such as Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands) or Trots op Nederland (Proud of the Netherlands) were founded. Though throughout the years more and more populist parties were formed, many of those could not secure durable electoral success (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012; Crum, 2023).

When looking at more recent populist appearances before the PVV, the quick rise of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn is arguably the most well-known example of populism. LPF stands for Lijst Pim Fortuyn (translated as Pim Fortuyn List) and was led by Fortuyn himself. Fortuyn was among the few politicians who embraced the term ‘populist’. Overall, the term ‘populism’ has a negative connotation in the Netherlands. It is often associated with politicians who make unfeasible promises and who describe complex problems in simplistic ways that don’t do justice to those problems. Though this association is not correct for all populist parties or politicians, it seems to be ingrained in society. Populism as described by Fortuyn, however, is about ‘translating the people’s gut feeling’ (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012, 91). By portraying the term ‘populism’ or ‘populist’ as merely translating the people’s will rather than a trick used in politics, it is used as an advantage.

The rise and fall of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn

‘Because of Fortuyn, I regained my trust in politics’ (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012, 119). This excerpt, taken from an interview about citizens’ motivation to vote for the populist right-wing party LPF in 2002, shows the significance of the party’s leader Pim Fortuyn within the party. The LPF was founded in 2002 and dominated the polls shortly after. Central to Fortuyn’s views was an aversion towards Islam paired with an anti-multiculturalist perspective. In the books Fortuyn wrote before his political career, he displayed his fear of Islamization in the Netherlands and the loss of ‘our Dutch identity’, which he regarded at risk due to multiculturalism. Research shows that the party’s stance on asylum and asylum policies was an important incentive for many citizens to vote for the LPF (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012).

However, research pointed out that in general terms, the Dutch population was content with the life it was living and economically thriving around this time. This leads one to wonder why so many citizens still voted for the LPF, a party that stated that the previous cabinet had made a mess that had to be cleaned up. Given the general state of mind, it came as a surprise to many journalists, politicians, and political scientists that this message resonated with a great number of citizens. Maybe, after a decade of “the end of politics” and “the end of history”, a decade in which all political issues had been translated into technocratic problems, there was a cry for ‘real politics’ and for politicians who dared to speak out and present some big ideas, no matter how nonsensical these ideas sometimes were: politicians like Fortuyn (Blokland, 2008)

Fortuyn was also known to present himself on various platforms outside the political field. Before he founded the LPF, he referred to himself as a ‘politician without party’, meaning that he shared his opinions on the establishment and society without belonging to a political party (Lucardie & Voerman, 2013, 100). His presence on TV eventually caused him to become a media politician, enabling him to become known to the general public. In this way, he inspired people from both left- and right-wing ideologies and even people who hadn’t shown interest in politics before. His newly founded party rose extraordinarily fast in the polls, though on May 6^th 2002, his career came to an abrupt end.

Shocking the whole nation, Pim Fortuyn was murdered two weeks before the 2002 elections. The murder was committed by a left-wing environmental activist. Due to the sudden loss of leadership and internal quarrels, the LPF soon imploded. Within a few years, the party disbanded. However, this did not mean the end of populism in The Netherlands. Fortuyn’s murder took place shortly after the 9/11 attacks and was followed by another political murder. In 2004, the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who openly criticized Islam and was to a certain extent known for his provocative remarks on the topic, was murdered by a radical Muslim. These murders and the 9/11 attacks combined, contributed to the creation of a breeding ground for criticism of Islam. The left was criticized for enabling Islamization. The absence of a right-wing populist party with an aversion towards (Islamic) migration helped to create a vacuum in which the PVV could eventually rise (Vossen, 2017).

Wilders and the current electoral success of the Partij voor de Vrijheid

The Partij Voor de Vrijheid was established in 2006 by Geert Wilders, who is still the party’s frontman to this day. The party came into the Second Chamber with 9 seats, which cannot be compared with the success of the LPF, but still is remarkable for a party entering the elections for the first time (Vossen, 2017). Both LPF and PVV rose quickly compared to other parties. Additionally, they both stand for anti-establishment, anti-migration (Islam specifically) and EU-scepticism. Lastly, the parties rely heavily on their leaders as a personification of the party and its values (Crum, 2023). However, it is hard to say whether the conditions in which the parties were established and rose are similar. While the LPF rose in a time where Fortuyn’s statements were unique by their controversy, it could be stated that Wilders’ remarks are unique by their extreme character. For instance, Fortuyn had never gone as far as Wilders did by proposing a tax on headscarves, banning the Quran and closing Mosques. Additionally, though both Fortuyn and Wilders expressed criticism of the EU, only Wilders would go as far as proposing to leave the EU altogether (Vossen, 2017).

In his book The Power of Populism – Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Koen Vossen (2017) divides the PVV’s ideology into four segments: anti-Islam sentiment, populism, nationalism, and the strive for stricter enforcement of the law. These segments summarize the party’s ideas that were unfolded in the election manifestos throughout the years. The phrase ‘Henk en Ingrid’ has been used many times by Wilders as a metaphor for the life of regular Dutch citizens. It is also used to stress the suffering of the common man, in some cases supposedly caused by (Islamic) migrants. As written in the manifesto of 2010: “[the welfare state is] no longer a shield for the weak, but a takeout window for a disproportionate amount of loitering Muslim immigrants instead. Henk and Ingrid are paying for Ali and Fatima” (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.5).

Though PVV’s electoral support has been relatively consistent over the years, the party only gained its biggest electoral success in 2023, 17 years after it was formed. I will return to the topic of the PVV’s appeal later in this article. What is more, the party’s structure has remained the same from 2006 until now. It has only ever had one member: Geert Wilders. In practice, this means that no one but Wilders has a say in the course of the party, which is a unique composition compared to other parties in the Netherlands (Vossen, 2017).

Except for pledging support from 2010-2012, the PVV has never been a part of a coalition. As a result, it remains questionable to say how much governmental influence the party has had over the past years. Research shows that during these years of support, the PVV let go their left-wing-oriented take on healthcare and supported the VVD’s right-wing policies. This could contribute to the idea that the PVV’s influence on governmental policies is not always ideological, but also opportunistic at times (Rinaldi & Bekker, 2021). Needless to say, Wilders and his party have had their influence on the regular debates in the Second Chamber. As stated, Wilders has structurally filled a prominent role in the opposition. To understand how the shift from opposition to coalition came about, it is necessary to first get into the appeal of populism in general and of the PVV specifically. Later in this article, I will revisit the popularity of PVV during the 2023 elections specifically and the current composition of the Dutch government.

What is the appeal of populism and the PVV in the Netherlands?

Usually, the election turnout rate at national elections is about 80. When voting for the municipal council, the percentage drops to 50-60. When fewer citizens vote, the parliament is less of a representation of the population and its values, thus lowering democratic legitimacy. The national elections of November 22^nd 2023 motivated almost 80% of the eligible voters to vote.

The research organization Ipsos created a profile of the people who voted for a certain party in the national elections of 2023. It turns out that in every age group, the PVV gained around 25% of the vote. When looking at the education level, however, results show that the PVV is more often voted for by people with lower forms of education. Significant differences in gender and voting preferences haven’t been found for the PVV, which is consistent with the party’s defense of women’s equality (Vieten, 2016). In the end, this was not the most important reason for people to vote for PVV. Around 80% said to be mostly concerned with the party’s main topics: immigration and asylum (Ipsos, 2023).

However, studies show that the general opinion towards migration has not become more dismissive compared to a few decades ago. It is argued that throughout the years, the public opinion on migration has not changed drastically, but the way citizens prioritize their values in the elections has. Whereas in the past Dutch citizens regarded their economic situation as an important variable in their political preference, along with the ideology of their pillar, citizens nowadays tend to prioritize cultural preferences. Partially the growth in economic welfare enabled citizens to be able not to vote in favor of their economic preferences but cultural ones instead (Danieli et. al, 2022).

What is more, skepticism towards the media and the government is becoming more and more mainstream, which populists can tap into. Undeniably, the rise of globalization and social media have played a role in the exchange of ideas, of which some are more liberal than others. As it is common in the Netherlands for journalists to strive for a neutral position, populist politicians are often given the same opportunities as other politicians. As a result, more radical and illiberal ideas are being given a stage and thus these ideas are normalized in society (de Jonge, 2019).

By using the mainstream media and social media to their advantage, there has been no need for big campaigns for the PVV to secure electoral success. Wilders’s account on the social media platform X alone counts 1,5 million followers and shows new posts daily. Whereas GroenLinks-PvdA and VVD spent millions on their campaigns, the PVV only spent 4500 euros on one single ad (Campagnemonitor, 2023). This is not to say that the PVV did not use other means to transfer its message to the public. Free publicity, such as appearances on TV shows and posting messages on X, is also an important factor in the spread of the ideas of the PVV.

Another factor that could explain the sudden (dis)appearing of populist parties is the growing importance of “floating voters”. Nowadays, there are many parties to choose from when it comes to voting. In 2023, 26 parties were eligible. Since there are no pillars anymore, it is not self-evident to vote for the party your family votes for or to keep voting for the same party throughout one’s life. Even more so, it is not self-evident for a considerable number of citizens to vote at all. One out of five voters in the 2023 election only decided to vote a week before the elections. Moreover, two-thirds of the citizens who voted PVV the last time voted either a different party in the past or did not vote at all before (Ipsos, 2023). These numbers illustrate the fact that citizens no longer stick to one ideology but are prone to change their minds until the last moment. As was the case with the elections of 2002, many voters are undecided during the campaign. This undecidedness is thus not unique for recent elections, nor is it unique for the past years: it is a trend that has been present for decennia (Blokland, 2008).

How are other parties coping and what is next?

The question remains: how are other parties supposed to cope with the presence and success of populist parties? In her book Responding to populist parties in Europe: the ‘other people’ vs the ‘populist people’, Bourne (2023) explores several modes of coping with populism. What is key, is the pursuit of militant democracy. Bourne describes this as ‘(…) a set of policy tools and political theories justifying the restriction of political rights of extremist groups in liberal democracies’ (Bourne, 2023, 5). Thus, restricting parties that are considered to be illiberal can serve as an effective measure to protect democracy.

This restriction can be done by opposing parties in the form of maintaining a cordon sanitaire, which refers to the isolation of a party by refusing collaboration (De Jonge, 2019). This tactic has been used successfully for several years by multiple Dutch parties by consistently refraining from any form of collaboration with the PVV. Especially after the VVD’s coalition with the support of the PVV collapsed in 2012, the VVD claimed never to collaborate with the PVV again (Crum, 2023). For a long time, the VVD lived up to this promise. In this respect, the VVD can be considered to have taken the role of a border party. As a result, despite the PVV’s relative popularity, the PVV was kept out of the political playfield until 2023.

Nevertheless, just weeks before the elections took place last year, VVD frontwoman Dilan Yesilgöz suddenly stated that the VVD did not rule out the PVV as a future coalition partner. This came as a surprise to many, as the VVD had been saying for years that a collaboration between these parties would never happen again. Especially for people who were wavering between VVD and PVV, the prospect of those parties collaborating was perceived as appealing. Thus, this statement offered an incentive for people to vote for PVV and so thereby the VVD contributed (inadvertently) to the PVV’s success. Additionally, the main theme of these elections was ‘livelihood security’. Wilders successfully connected this theme to the theme ‘migration’ by declaring that something needed to be done about the migration flow to offer citizens livelihood security. The combination of this narrative and the statement of Yesilgöz have both contributed to the rise in the number of votes for PVV (VRT, 2023).

After the elections, 200 days of negotiation took place. Eventually, a coalition was formed. The cabinet now consists of representatives of the populist right-wing PVV, liberal VVD, farmer’s party BBB, and newcomer NSC[3]. Thus, after years of maintaining a cordon sanitaire, a populist party has made it into the government.

There is no general guide that can be used to counter populism on either a national or international scale. It is possible to condemn illiberal ideas suggested by populist parties. However, the stigmatization of populist parties and their ideas can also backfire into a confirmation of the idea that ‘the elite’ is indeed against ‘the people’, also when these stigmas are not originating from ‘the elite’ (Bourne, 2023).

Rather than stigmatizing populists and their voters, we need to recognize elements of truth in populist positions. Contemporary liberal democracies often do reflect the positions of the so-called ‘elite’ rather than those of citizens. Therefore, voting for a populist party can be regarded as voting for a more democratic system, even if that party in its core does not always support democratic ideas.

Moreover, the fact that a part of the population votes for a populist party does not mean the members of this group have similar beliefs. Accordingly, Bächtiger & Dryzek (2024) suggest that hosting mini-publics in which citizens converse with one another can show them how much their preferences and backgrounds differ. This can counter the narrative about “the elite” versus “the people”.

Besides acknowledging the truth in the reasons why citizens vote for populist parties and deliberating, it is important to offer alternatives to the populist discourse that are accessible to populist voters. In practice, this means that discussions on political themes should be substantive and informing, though still appealing to populist voters. Bächtiger & Dryzek (2024) state in an example that instead of rejecting a populist voter’s perspective on immigration, another narrative can be posed in which the benefits of immigration are included, such as economic welfare for non-immigrants.

As discussed, in the past, few populist parties have been able to maintain their electoral support in the Netherlands. In this sense, the current situation in which the PVV is the largest party in the cabinet can be considered a new and unique situation. However, as the political landscape is always in motion, the PVV’s recent success can hardly predict the course of events in the future. Additionally, a narrative that is often used by populist politicians is that the established elite is not listening to the will of the people. This will be problematic to maintain if the populist party itself is part of the establishment.

However, if the cabinet collapses, this could just as much form a new breeding ground for populism. The PVV could offer the voters the very same narrative that brought it to power: the PVV and its voters are not being taken seriously by the establishment. It could also contribute to the rise of new populist parties. What is certain is that populism in the Netherlands is not over yet: perhaps it has just begun.

Abbreviations

PVV : Partij Voor de Vrijheid, Freedom Party. Populist party in the Netherlands led by Geert Wilders.

GroenLinks – PvdA : GroenLinks-Partij Voor De Arbeid, Green Left-Labor Party. A combination of two left parties that joined forces in the run-up to the 2023 national elections.

LPF : Lijst Pim Fortuyn, Fortuyn List. Populist party in the early 00’s led by Pim Fortuyn.

VVD : Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, People’s party for Freedom and Democracy. Liberal party that has had the upper hand and served as a border party for populism for the past decade.

BBB : BoerBurgerBeweging, Farmer’s party. A party established in 2019 to stand up for the farmers. The party gained the most electoral success, compared to other competing parties, in the municipal elections of 2023.

NSC : Nieuw Sociaal Contract, New Social Contract. A party established in 2023 that is known for its desire to restructure the existing structure around governance.

Sources

Bächtiger, A., & Dryzek, J. S. (2024). Deliberative Democracy for Diabolical Times: Confronting Populism, Extremism, Denial, and Authoritarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blokland, H. (2008). Een lange leegte: over maatschappelijk onbehagen, politieke competentie en het plannen van een toekomst. Uitgeverij Klement.

Bourne, A. K. (2023). Mapping Initiatives Opposing Populist Parties in Europe. In: Responding to populist parties in Europe : the ‘other people’ vs the ‘populist people’. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198892588.001.0001

Campagnemonitor. (2023). Uitgaven. Retrieved at 07-10-2024 at https://campagnemonitor.groene.nl/spending.html

Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (n. d.). Het verschil in opkomst tussen Tweede Kamerverkiezingen en gemeenteraadsverkiezingen. Retrieved at 26-09-2024 at https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/statistische-trends/2022/het-verschil-in-opkomst-tussen-tweede-kamerverkiezingen-en-gemeenteraadsverkiezingen?onepage=true

Danieli, O., Gidron, N., Kikuchi, S. & and Levy, R. (2022). Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4255937

Ipsos. (2023). Verkiezingsonderzoek Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2023. https://www.ipsos.com/nl-nl/verkiezingsonderzoek-tweede-kamerverkiezingen-2023

de Jonge, L. (2019). The Populist Radical Right and the Media in the Benelux: Friend or Foe? The International Journal of Press/Politics, 24(2), 189-209. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218821098

Leininger, A., & Meijers, M. J. (2021). Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence From Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies. Political Studies, 69(3), 665-685. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720923257

Lucardie, P., & Voerman, G. (2012). Populisten in de polder. Boom. https:// www.uitgeverijboom.nl/boeken/geschiedenis/populisten_in_de_polder_9789461057044/

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Partij Voor de Vrijheid. (2010). De agenda van hoop en optimisme. PVV election manifesto.

Rinaldi, C. & Bekker, M. (2021). In: Falkenbach, M., & Greer, S. L. (2021). The populist radical right and health : national policies and global trends. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70709-5

Vieten, U.M. (2016). Far Right Populism and Women: The Normalisation of Gendered Anti-Muslim Racism and Gendered Culturalism in the Netherlands. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37(6), 621–636. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2016.1235024

Vossen, K. (2017). The Power of Populism: Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. New York: Routledge.

VRT. (2023). Hoe is Geert Wilders aan zijn monsterscore geraakt? “VVD zette deur open” en door “migratie aan bestaanszekerheid te koppelen”. Retrieved at 10-10-2024 at https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2023/11/23/hoe-is-geert-wilders-aan-zijn-monsterzege-geraakt/

Witte, D. (2017). The precarity of critique: Cultures of mistrust and the refusal of justification. Filozofija i drustvo, 28(2). 231-249. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1702231W

Notes

^[1] A list of all of the abbreviations used in this essay can be found at the end.

[2] This party is a union of two parties.

[3] These parties are listed at the end of the article.