- Bolivian Populism and Clientelism - December 22, 2024
At the core of this paper on Bolivian populism is the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism) or MAS, the political party currently in power. I argue that Bolivian populism is rooted in the national political discourse and culture that arose in 1952, the year the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) or MNR took power. Neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (to which the MAS opposed) and the influence of Indianism were other central factors in the upheaval of the MAS. I postulate that MAS populism has furthered a patrimonial and clientelist state.
Populism has attracted the attention of many scholars due to the rise of “populist” forces over the last years in Europe and Latin America. But, is populism a similar political phenomenon in both regions? Or, do political culture, social-economic conditions, and historic circumstances play any role in shaping populist traditions? This paper examines the populist phenomenon in Bolivia throughout the experience of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism) or MAS, the ruling political party in the country. To do so, this paper tries to answer two simple questions: What is populism in Bolivia? and What are the main features of the MAS populism as a political party as well as a government? I focus on the period that the MAS was under the leadership of Evo Morales. In 1997, the year of general national elections, the MAS appeared in the Bolivian political scenario as a revolutionary party with several demands for social justice. This party also claimed the vindication of “Indianness”, an aspect that distinguished it from other national parties. In 2003, during the uprising against the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (r. 1993-1997, and 2002-2003), the MAS became a decisive national movement.
I argue that Bolivian populism is rooted in political discourses since 1952, when the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) or MNR took power and implemented social reforms. In addition, the MAS populism is a reaction to the 1990s neo-liberal policies. The MAS’ political discourses and practices encompasses claims for redistribution, the use of natural resources as an exclusive national property, and the vindication of the “Indian character”. I also state that the MAS populism (and Bolivian populism in general) produces a patrimonialist state and a system of clientelism. This study is divided into three parts. The first discusses Bolivian populism and the origins of the MAS (1997-2006). The second examines its discourses and political practices as a government between 2006 and 2019. And, the third is an exploration of populism and clientelism.
To understand the term “populism” this paper uses Ernesto Laclau’s definition (2005: 131-132). He argues that populism is a way to construct the political arena, when the working classes (“the underdogs”) question the status quo and the elites. In practical terms, a political actor (a party or a leader) brings together several urgent social demands. This creates a new political discourse, usually imprecise and vague, that replaces the dominant political language.
Soledad Stoessel and Olga Bracco (2024) also argue that populism arises in times of social crisis, periods in which local political elites are uncapable to meet social needs. In their perspective, populism is a political program or movement which seeks to create a new social order and new identities. They distinguish two keys to understand the Latin American populism: First, as a polarizing rhetoric in which the excluded people (“the underdogs”) question the power and privileges of the elite. Second, as a political process in which the state is in hands of the populist leader/s, and s/he uses this to channel the political and social demands of his/her followers.
Stoessel and Braco have proposed a periodization of Latin American populism: The Classic Period (1930-1970), the 1990s , the 21st Century Populism. For Stoessel and Braco, the regimes of Lázaro Cárdenas (r. 1934-1940) and Juan Domingo Perón (r. 1946-1955) are classic example of early twentieth-century Latin American populism.[1] Their regimes were redistributive, nationalist, and the state was the driving force in the national economy. During Cárdenas’ regime, oil industry was nationalized in 1938. His regime expropriated this industry from U.S. companies with repercussions in and beyond Latin America (Hegron, 2020). In the 1990s, Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) emerges, as well as his heroic of Bolivarianism. His regime claimed the figure of Liberator Simón Bolívar (1783-1830) as a model of “revolutionary leader,” and also questioned the role of the United States in the politics and economy of the region.[2] His style influenced South American politics, especially in the cases of Rafael Correa (r. 2007-2017) and Evo Morales (r. 2006-2019). They are part of the “third wave of populism”, which arose in the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, in this new trend of populism, figures appeared associated with the right and liberalism: Jair Bolsonaro (r. 2019-2022) and Nayib Bukele (since 2019 President of El Salvador). Bukele also brought to the public debate the question of “security”, adopting extreme measures of punishment in the Salvadorean law.
Bolivian Populism and the Origins of the MAS
Bolivian populism has several historical phases. We should first go back to 1952, the beginning of the Revolutionary period. The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) guided by its leader, Víctor Paz Estennssoro (1907-2001) rose to power and implemented a set of redistributive reforms. This include a land reform, educative universal suffrage, and its most ambitious program: the nationalization of the tin, silver, and mining industry in Bolivia (Klein, 1991, pp. 227-245). Although the mines in theory were property of the state, in fact, the barons of tin (as the tin elite was called) dominated the economic sphere and the mining activities.[3] The MNR created a cooperative system for the exploitation of mines. Mining was the most important economic activity in the country.
In the decade of the 1980s, Bolivia returned to civilian government. In 1982, Hernán Siles Zuazo (1914-1996) was elected as president (after a long military interregno). However, due to inflation, economic turmoil, and the threat of a military coup d’Etat, he left power in 1985. The MNR retook power and Víctor Paz Estenssoro aligned with neo-liberalism. Bolivia is one of the first examples of Latin American neo-liberalism in the 1980s. Under the banner of “saving Bolivia,” Víctor Paz Estenssoro adopted neoliberal political measures: open economy, pro-business policies, deregulation, reduction of labor rights, and the gradual abandonment of the reforms of 1952. Privatization of natural resources (mining, gas, and water) was part of this. Social protests rose, and the miners organized demonstrations.[4] Sánchez de Lozada’s regime triggered the ascent of the MAS[5]. In 1997, the MAS joint with the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cochabamba (Confederation of Workers of Cochabamba), most of them coca leavers. Evo Morales, the leader of the union of workers in Cochabamba, was elected as member of Parliament. He became one of the most important critics of the neo-liberal 
project in Bolivia. The imposition of a Super Tax (El Impuestazo as it was called) caused massive protests, many of them led by the MAS and Evo Morales. There were many victims between March and October of 2003 (the Gas War). In October of that year, Sánchez de Lozada left power and fled to the United States.[6] Under the presidency of Rodríguez Veltzé new elections took place in December 2005, and Evo Morales was elected president.[7]
The MAS sought the support of working class people, peasants, and members of impoverished groups.[8] The antiliberal (or anti free market) discourse was a means to channel a massive support in a period of discontent with privatizations and rising of cost of living. Gradually, important unions supported (and also were co-opted) like the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Central) and the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (National Union of Rural Workers of Bolivia)
Likewise, the MAS received the support of peasant organizations and the ayllus (social basic units in the rural Andes). Political discourse of indianismo played a central nexus in this connection with rural communities. Indianismo extols the Indian heritage and civilization. Prominent author of indianismo was Fausto Reinaga (1906-1994), writer and lawyer who published La Revolución India (La Paz, 1970) in which he advocated for a radical transformation of the Bolivian society, and for an indigenous leadership. Indianistas started the use of symbols like whipala (the square emblem used as a flag) and the vindication of the Indian history of Bolivia. This movement precedes the MAS, but the latter incorporated all these symbols in its discourse and practices. In addition, indigenous communities have a long tradition of mobilization and struggles for communal rights and land (Gotkowitz 2011: 23-42). The history of Bolivia has several examples of rural or indigenous mobilizations since colonial times (Klein 1991: 26-86, and Thomson 2002). The MAS used these elements in its rhetoric and ideological framework.
In his analysis on Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela Felipe Burbano detailed the common patterns of the regimes of Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Hugo Chávez (the Populism of the 1990s and the 21st Century). Firstly, the centrality of state as a political and economic actor. Leftist populism questioned the role of private companies in the economy, especially corporations and multinational enterprises. Neoliberal policies of foreign direct investments (FDI) and privatizations were questioned. The state was the new arbiter of socio-economic policies. Secondly, the idea of patria (fatherland) as a crucial concept that served to legitimize the government and the idea of an imagined national community. Nationalism plays a significant role in these movements. The defense of natural resources from the “foreign greed” is an important point of their political agendas. Finally, the idea of a “new beginning,” a new era of redemption and social change. This belief in the starting of a revolutionary period rooted in the nineteenth-century early liberalism of the Age of Independence. Liberals at that time believed in the commencement of a new period that was significant different to the colonial era. The colonial times were associated with exploitation and backwardness. These three patterns (state, fatherland, and new beginning) marked the discourses of the MAS and also its future experience as a government.
MAS in the government: 2006-2019
Evo Morales was elected president on December 18th, 2005. He received 53% of the popular support. The second place was occupied by Jorge Quiroga with the 28% of the votes. Once he was elected, Morales started off a process of political and economic transformations. He denounced the dependency of Bolivia and its affiliation to the so called “Consensus of Washington.” This term was used in the 1990s to describe a series of policies to promote free-market, private enterprise, the liberalization of the national economies, and economic stability. The central actors in the creation of these policies were The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department, all of them located in Washington D.C. Some critics considered that this set of ideas was an example of “liberal ‘fundamentalism.” In the case of Latin America, the Washington Consensus was promoted especially by President Bill Clinton (r. 1993-2001).[9]
In sharp contrast, Evo Morales decided to join the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) led by Venezuela, and tried to transform the country into a social economy. Natural resources were central for that project. His government increased control of the hydrocarbon industry. He changed the rates and obligated the companies to pay 82% of profits to the state. Like Lázaro Cárdenas and Víctor Paz Estenssoro had done before, the natural resources were the means to support public expenditures. In addition, Evo Morales and the MAS employed the indigenous symbols. Quechua and Aymara were used in the official scenario.[10] In 2006, the government introduced the Bono Juancito Pinto. It was a supplementary economic support to parents who sent their children to the public schools. The government also created other programs for senior citizens and mothers (Renta Dignidad and Bono Juana Azurduy). That year, a Constituent Assembly was elected on July 2nd. The new chart was promulgated in 2009 and recognized the “plurinational” character of the country. It also sanctioned the important role of the state in a mixed economy, and declared that the natural resources belonged to the Bolivian people (although the state was the administrator).
Between 2005 and 2014, the MAS swept the elections. However, in 2016 a referendum forbade Morales to run for president again. In 2017, the Plurinational Constitutional Court nevertheless allowed him to run. That decision generated demonstrations against Morales, and even some regions that traditionally supported him, turned into opposition.
Following a long patrimonialist tradition, the MAS had hired followers as bureaucrats. Likewise, Evo Morales used the patronage system as a means of government and of rewarding his allies. Patronage had expanded across the country and accusations of corruption increased. This was the beginning of the end of the MAS, resulting in the political crisis of November 2019.
Populism and Clientelism
The political discourses of (national) identity and economic redistribution have been instrumental in legitimizing the Bolivian government policies during the regimes of the MAS and previously the MNR (in the 1950s and the 1960s). At the same time, both parties created a system of patronage. The MNR model had a pro peasantry discourse under a model of cultural assimilation. The idea of mestizaje and the use of Spanish as the national language were two main elements of the MNR policies. In its turn, the MAS recognized the rights and traditions (including the languages) of the indigenous peoples.
Colonial legacy has been central in the making of Bolivian history. It entails the premise that society is divided into antagonistic sectors: Spaniards (and creole sectors) and indigenous or native peoples with “essential” attributes.[11] Middle class intellectuals and party leaders considered that they were the agents of change building up a patrimonialist state. In this perspective, the state was an instrument for the allotment of jobs and clientelism.
From a decolonial perspective Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2024) criticized the use of a pro-Indian rhetoric by an urban intellectual middle class (and also “white” in Bolivian terms) of the MAS, which assumes the representation of these native communities. She argues that the MAS project mainly wanted to strengthen the state in detrimental of the autonomy of the indigenous communities and the ordinary citizens. In theory, the state is “plurinational” but in reality it is centrist. In addition, the actual power of the state is in the hands of the circle of MAS leaders. Likewise, Rivera Cusicanqui emphasizes that the Bolivian patrimonialist state is an example of colonial practices given that favoritism and clientelism are key practices. The MAS established a clientelistic system that rewarded the loyalty (to the party), and punished the opposition. It goes without saying that this undermines the foundations of liberal democracy.
The MAS is in now power for almost two decades. The years 2019 and 2021 were the most critical for the party. Evo Morales left office in November 2019, and afterwards exiled in Mexico. Today, Bolivian opposition is diverse and heterogenous. Comunidad Ciudadana (Citizen Community), the second political force in the elections of 2021, is a conjunction of several parties.
The economic situation is Bolivia is critical today. Fuel shortages, inflation, and the increased use of the US dollar (with respect to the national currency) have had its toll. The bad economic situation has strengthened populist discourses by the government, the Evo Morales faction, and the regional movement of Santa Cruz. The government and Evo Morales share the premises of socio-economic redistribution and the promotion of the indigenous heritage. In turn, the Comité Cívico defend the values of capitalism (to oppose the “socialist” character of the regime), regional identity, and reject indianismo.
Democracy is at a crossroad in Bolivia. The MAS with its two factions and the Comité Cívico do not believe in democracy, check and balances, and the rule of law. This impedes a strengthening of needed political institutions.
Conclusion
Populism of the MAS is rooted in Bolivian political history. Although there were already populist leaders in the nineteenth century, populism as a practice and discourse started in the Revolutionary Period after 1952. Caudillismo, patronage and patrimonialism was a common feature of the MNR (in the 1950s and 1960s), and the MAS (in the 21st century). It has obstructed the building of much needed democratic institutions. Bolivia still has a long way to go to build a stable, open, pluralist democracy.
References
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Gotkowitz, Laura. La revolución antes de la Revolución. Luchas indígenas por tierra y justicia en Bolivia, 1880-1952. La Paz: Plural Editores, 2011.
Harten, Sven. The Rise of Evo Morales and the MAS. London: Zed Books, 2011.
Hegron, Bastien. “The Mexican Oil Expropiation in 1938 and France Repercussions. Negotiations and Mexican Public Diplomacy,” Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México, 60, 218-256, 2020.
Jacobsen, Nils. Ilusiones de la transición. El altiplano peruano, 1780-1930. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2017.
Klein, Herbert S. Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Laclau, Ernesto. La razón populista. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005.
Lavaud, Jean-Pierre. El embrollo boliviano: Turbulencias sociales y desplazamientos políticos 1952-1982. La Paz: HISBOL, 1998.
Levine. Robert M. Father of the Poor? Vargas and His Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Loza, Carmen Beatriz et al. Para que no se olvide. 12-13 de febrero 2003. La Paz: Plural Editores, 2004.
Rivera Cusicanqui Silvia. “Respuesta a Álvaro García Linera. Indianizar al mestizaje y descolonizar al gobierno”, Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno, N. 140 (March 15, 2024), pp. 8-9.
Saravia, Joaquín and Godofredo Sandoval. Jach’a Uru ¿La esperanza de un pueblo? Carlos Palenque, RTP y los sectores populares urbanos en La Paz. La Paz: ILDIS-CEP and CIMA, 1991.
Stoessel, Soledad and Bracco Olga. Antipopulismos en América Latina desde una perspectiva histórica, 2024. https://historiapolitica.com/dossiers/dossier-antipopulismos-en-america-latina-desde-una-perspectiva-historica/
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Notes
[1] Another example of populism is the regime of Getúlio Vargas (r. 1930-1934, 1934-1945, and 1950-1954). He sided with fascism (especially the Italian model) in the 1930s. Vargas enacted a protective labor and social legislation receiving the support of significant numbers of the Brazilian working class. For a review of his regime and policies, see: Levine (1998).
[2] In 1998, Hugo Chávez won the elections. He installed a new constitution (1999) and reoriented the government to ‘social’ and ‘socialist policies.’ With Chávez, the Pact of Punto Fijo of 1958 ended. Some of his central policies were: a) land reforms, b) construction of a network of hospitals and medical services, c) improvement of rural education, d) a new foreign policy and a period of confrontation with the United States and the ‘Consensus of Washington’, and e) the nationalization of the companies that were privatized during the 1990s. Chávez’s government reduced the levels of poverty and inequality in Venezuela. However, the ‘cult of personality’ and the alienation of the middle and upper classes started off a period of internal confrontation. In March 2013, Chávez passed away and Nicolás Maduro took office.
[3] Simón Patiño (1860-1947) and Moritz Hochschild (1881-1965) were two of the tycoons of the tin mining industry.
[4] After Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the regimes of Jaime Paz Zamora (r. 1989-1993), Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (r. 1993-1997), Hugo Bánzer Suárez and Jorge Quiroga (1997-2002) and once again Sánchez de Lozada (r. 2002-2003) continued with pro-market policies.
[5] This party was founded in 1987 by Filemón Escobar (1934-2017) and David Añez. Escobar was a miner and a leader of the Bolivian union of miners. Although this party was socialist, it derives from the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSG) a neo-fascist party founded in 1937 by Oscar Unzaga de la Vega (1916-1959), a catholic intellectual and admirer of the Italian and Spanish fascism.
[6] He still living there today. In September 2023, he reached an agreement with the family of eight victims of the events in October 2003. Sánchez de Lozada and his minister, Carlos Sánchez Berzaín (b. 1959), were demanded for $ 10 million compensation in a court of Miami, Florida.
[7] In that election, MAS obtained 53% of the votes. In 2009, its popular support was higher: 63%. The votes in the countryside were crucial in the MAS victory.
[8] The MAS represented the hope for a social change. In the early decade of the 1990s, a leader who represented analternative for the improverished Bolivians, and especially in La Paz, was Carlos Palenque Avilés (1944-1997). He was the leader of a party called CONDEPA (Conciencia de Patria, in English means Party of the Consciousness of the Fatherland). Evo Morales has recognized that charismatic Palenque, also called the Compadre, was a model for his leadership and an important predecessor. On Palenque and his impact on Bolivian politics, see Saravia and Sandoval (1991).
[9] The decade of the 1990s was the time of privatization in Latin America, and two countries were the central examples of this trend: Argentina with Carlos Menem (1989-1999) and Peru with Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000).
[10] In that context, the eastern part of the country, and led by the department of Santa Cruz, became the principal place anti-MAS. The department of Santa Cruz reasserted its pro-business policies and employed profusely the symbols of the department such as the Santa Cruz flag. It was the beginning of a “cultural war” between the MAS and the eastern or the so-called “half Moon” of Bolivia (and composed by the departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija). In 2006 Bolivian regional autonomy referendum, 58% of voters supported the national unity.
[11] Jacobsen 2013: 30-33.