Introduction

The outcome of the Dutch national elections in October 2025 was welcomed by numerous foreign media outlets as a victory for moderate political parties and a defeat for populism. There was a sense of relief, and many hoped this could be seen as a harbinger of future elections in countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, or even the United States.

Thus, Süddeutsche Zeitung reported: “The era after Wilders begins. The Dutch have taught the right-wing populist a lesson: In the parliamentary elections, the social liberals triumphed with surprise winner Rob Jetten” (October 30, 2025). Der Tagesspiegel ran the headline: “Dutch election: Turning point in the Netherlands — left-liberals win… The big loser is right-wing populist Wilders” (October 31, 2025).

In England, The Guardian observed in a similar vein: “Geert Wilders faces shutout as centrists hail huge gains… support for his far-right Freedom Party (PVV) slumped and the liberal-progressive D66 party made spectacular gains.” D66 was defined as “a pro-European party with liberal economic views but a progressive stance on most social issues” (October 30, 2025).

Relief was also palpable in leading American newspapers. Under the headline “A Far-Right Party Faces Rebuke in the Netherlands,” The New York Times wrote: “Geert Wilders suffered a loss of support as a center-left party staged major gains, an election result that could offer lessons for Europe’s far right.” The authors went on to write hopefully: “That sudden reorientation is likely to usher in a more centrist government in the Netherlands, which says something about the state of not only Dutch politics but of populism in Europe more broadly. It shows that the far right, even in a place that had once seemed to be on an inexorable march toward greater power, is capable of hitting a roadblock” (October 30, 2025).

Journalists at The Washington Post likewise spoke of “a blow to the far right.” They continued: “The election became a microcosm of competing visions in the West, with Wilders representing a staunchly anti-migrant and populist view in line with the ‘Make America Great Again’ movement in the United States and far-right parties across Europe. Jetten’s party embraced the politics of civility, promises of affordable housing, and a green agenda… Especially if Jetten — a photogenic, pro-E.U. and openly gay political leader — becomes prime minister, the outcome would also be seen as a pendulum shift and provide lessons for European centrists threatened by hard-right victories on the continent” (October 31, 2025).[1]

The sense of relief appears to have stood in the way of sober analysis. Moreover, the Dutch political system is evidently difficult for many foreign journalists to grasp. There was far less good news to report than was often suggested.

For instance, the total number of seats held by the various populist parties did not decline. Rather, seats merely shifted from one right-wing populist party to another. In addition, despite two years of mismanagement by the incumbent right-wing populist cabinet, virtually all left-wing opposition parties lost ground. Equally bad news for democracy was the further fragmentation of the political landscape—this time no fewer than 15 parties were elected to parliament. Never before had a party with so few seats (26 out of 150) emerged as the largest. As a result, the chances of forming a stable, effective government capable of addressing societal problems declined even further. The same is true of parliament’s ability to hold the government to account.

What is particularly striking is that voters increasingly seem to be guided by the mood of the moment. Never before had there been so many “floating voters” who, in the weeks or even days before the election, still did not know whom they would vote for. The votes cast appear to be based less and less on information, substantive debate, or careful consideration of alternative policy programs, visions of society and humanity, or values and political goals. Instead, they seem to reflect rapidly shifting, fleeting impressions and sympathies, as well as a rare combination of indifference and recalcitrance. New parties and leaders in the Netherlands repeatedly rise spectacularly in the voters’ favor, only to disappear just as quickly as they emerged. In effect, voters appear to be acting haphazardly, and at the very last moment. The idea that voters had arrived at a rational, well-founded rejection of populism—or of anything else, for that matter—as journalists and politicians are all too eager to read into election results, therefore seems irresponsibly optimistic.

If politics in the Netherlands has any predictive value for developments in other countries, it is worth taking a closer look at Dutch political trends. On the basis of the recent elections, the analysis below seeks to do just that. As a guiding framework, I will outline the recent evolution of the major political parties. Which factors can explain these developments? And what are the consequences for democracy and the governance of the country?

New Social Contract

To illustrate the volatility of politics in the Netherlands, we can best start by describing the recent rise and fall of the party called New Social Contract (Nieuw Sociaal Contract or NSC).

The New Social Contract lost all 20 of its seats in the last election.[2] The NSC was founded in 2023 by Christian Democrat MP Pieter Omtzigt, who had previously left the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl or CDA) after a failed bid for leadership. His main theme was the rule of law: a government should be reliable, predictable, reasonable, decent, and abide by the law. Omtzigt made a name for himself as a member of parliament by persistently and successfully defending two specific groups of citizens who had been mangled by the government for years. Even after the government had recognized and acknowledged the illegality and unreasonableness of this, the settlement of the issues in question, which required financial compensation for the affected citizens, dragged on for years, and in fact continues to this day.

Specifically, the first issue was the so-called “Childcare Benefits Scandal” (Toeslagenaffaire): citizens were wrongfully accused by the Dutch tax authorities of having unlawfully claimed benefits to finance childcare and were forced to repay all benefits. This led to bankruptcies, evictions, and broken relationships. In addition, there was the “Groningen gas affair”: in the northernmost Dutch province of Groningen, the government had been extracting large quantities of gas since the 1960s, which led to subsidence of houses and buildings, and even earthquakes. The parliamentary inquiry committee set up by parliament concluded in 2023 that the government had systematically ignored the interests and concerns of the citizens living in the area.[3] The settlement of the damage claims is also still ongoing today.

In 2023, the NSC had grown from nothing to 20 seats (out of the 150 available seats). In the August 2023 polls, 31 seats were even considered possible[4], sparking an intense public debate about whether party leader Omtzigt should become the new prime minister. He himself did not seem to have this ambition at the time and also appeared overwhelmed by the sudden growth of his newly founded party. In the end, the NSC became “only” the third party, behind the right-wing conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie or VVD) and the right-wing populist Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid or PVV).

After the elections, following lengthy negotiations, the NSC entered into a coalition with the VVD, the PVV, and the populist Farmer-Citizen Movement (BoerBurgerBeweging or BBB), which had also experienced sudden growth. For a party that claimed to stand primarily for the rule of law, a coalition with a party such as the PVV meant the loss of all credibility. After all, Wilders’ PVV supports numerous measures that are unconstitutional (banning the Koran, closing mosques, closing the borders to refugees). Moreover, the party advocates pushing through the “will of the people,” as expressed exclusively by the party, regardless of the applicable democratic decision-making procedures. The political leader Omtzigt also found the daily conflicts with Wilders, fought mainly on Twitter, so psychologically stressful that he first spent months at home suffering from burnout and then left politics altogether, which also explains why his party, the NSC, completely imploded just a year and a half after its founding.

Farmer-Citizen Movement

The Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB) was founded in 2019, won a single seat in the 2021 elections for the House of Representatives, rose spectacularly to 16 seats in the Senate (out of 100 seats) in 2023, and won seven seats in the 2023 elections for the House of Representatives (out of 150 seats). The latter figure was a disappointment for the party: in the April 2023 polls, the party was even predicted to win 31 seats or 19.3% of the votes, which would have made it the largest party.[5] In the last elections in October 2025, the number of seats fell again from 7 to 4. As expected, the majority of its current voters live in the relatively less populated north and east of the country. At the height of its popularity, however, it received support from across the country.

The BBB claims to represent the interests of farmers and rural residents.[6] Central to this is challenging the environmental and climate policies of the Dutch government and the European Union. In an attempt to remain relevant after a year and a half of inaction in the coalition government formed after the 2023 elections, the party adopted much of Wilders’ populist agenda in its 2025 election campaign. Migration and Islam (which rural residents notice little of, incidentally) were made major issues. But why vote for a surrogate when the original (the PVV) is also available?

Why was this party able to rise to such heights, especially in the polls? Admittedly, the Netherlands is an agricultural superpower—despite its extremely small surface area, agricultural production in 2022 was worth approximately €36 billion, representing around 7% of the total value of agricultural production in the entire European Union.[7] Germany, by comparison, produces about twice that amount, but the country is almost nine times larger than the Netherlands and is much less densely populated. In addition to 18 million people, the Netherlands is home to approximately 650,000 goats, 800,000 sheep, 4 million cattle, 10 million pigs (20 years earlier there were even 15 million) and around 100 million chickens in 2025.[8] There are also nearly half a million horses and ponies, but these are only for pleasure, as are the approximately 3 million cats, 1.7 million dogs, and 400,000 rabbits.[9]

All of the animals mentioned cause significant environmental pollution, particularly an enormous amount of nitrogen, which far exceeds European Union norms. The EU has been pointing this out to the Netherlands for decades, but each time, under the influence of a powerful farming lobby, the necessary measures have been postponed or canceled. However, under growing pressure from the European Union and environmental organizations and parties, the Dutch government slowly but surely took measures to solve the nitrogen problem. For example, farmers were persuaded to give up their businesses and professions with generous financial compensation, an opportunity that was mainly taken up by smaller businesses. This trend towards a less agricultural society led to increasing resistance from farmers. Thousands of tractors with angry farmers regularly brought traffic to a standstill in large parts of the country. And it led to the seemingly unstoppable rise of the Farmer Citizen Movement.

However, this rise is difficult to explain rationally. As stated, the BBB represents the rather particularistic interests of farmers and rural residents. First of all, structurally speaking, no more than approximately 300,000 people are employed in the entire Dutch agricultural sector, which is less than 2% of the total workforce.[10] Furthermore, there are not many people living in the countryside, which is scarce in the Netherlands. According to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), no more than about seven percent of the population lives in rural areas.[11] As in the United States and most other countries in the world, urbanization is also on the rise in the Netherlands.[12]

So who were the voters of the Farmer Citizen Movement? There are too few people working in the agricultural sector and too few people living in rural areas to be able to garner 20% of the vote in polls. Besides, the interests of farmers and people living on the countryside often conflict with those of city-dwellers. Approximately 66% of the land area in the Netherlands is used for agricultural activities. In a densely populated country with a large housing shortage and few recreational opportunities, there is practically not enough space for these, mainly export-oriented agricultural activities. In addition, the nitrogen surplus means that no new houses (which also cause nitrogen pollution) can be built and that a heavy burden is placed on the little remaining fauna and flora.

Talk show democracy

Why would people vote for the Farmer Citizen Movement or consider doing so? The media role of the populist party leader, Caroline van der Plas (referred to as “Caroline” in party communications), was probably decisive. Like other populists, this former agricultural journalist spoke the language of “the people” and claimed to fight for ordinary men and women against the (metropolitan) elite. She dismissed scientists and activists who advocated environmental measures as “woke.” She portrayed the European Union as the great enemy that forced the Netherlands to take all kinds of measures that were contrary to the national interest. Many perceived her as direct, ordinary, approachable, and authentic. She was also a very welcome guest on the mostly right-wing folksy talk shows, which collectively put her on a pedestal.[13]

Erasmus University Rotterdam, in collaboration with the quality newspaper NRC-Handelsblad, investigated how much speaking time various politicians and opinion makers were given on the eleven most important talk shows between September 1 and 30, 2025.[14] The results showed that “of the leaders of political parties, Caroline van der Plas (74 minutes) received the most speaking time, followed by Rob Jetten (D66) and Frans Timmermans (PvdA/GroenLinks). Looking at the parties themselves, we see that the BBB and VVD received the most speaking time.” This is remarkable because, as opinion polls and the final election results showed, the BBB had become a relatively insignificant player by the end of 2025. Furthermore, this particularistic interest-based party has little to say about almost all political issues that transcend manure and nitrogen.

The right-wing populist talk show hosts and guests (they invite each other) Johan Derksen (268 minutes), Wierd Duk (84 minutes), and Raymond Mens (80 minutes) received the most speaking time of all. Derksen is a former soccer player and soccer journalist, Duk is a right-wing conservative opinion maker for the largest newspaper in the Netherlands, De Telegraaf, who also has his own podcast, and Mens is a “political commentator” and former campaign leader and spin doctor for the VVD.[15]

It has often been noted (also in Germany[16]) that only a relatively small group of people have access to the media and that the very same people are invited time and again to give their opinion on something, even when they are by no means experts on the subject. It is their fame that grants them access, not their expertise.

The research shows, writes media sociologist Ruigrok, “that right-wing politicians, parties, and commentators are generally dominant in the Dutch talk show landscape.” It is striking that right-wing opinion makers have also in the Netherlands succeeded in establishing the image that the media are dominated by the left. They constantly present themselves as unheard and oppressed, thus not deviating from the familiar populist narrative.

The most important talk show in the Netherlands, with more than a million live viewers every day and a large presence via clips on YouTube and other social media, is Vandaag Inside.[17] The aforementioned 76-year-old Derksen and, to a lesser extent, Telegraaf journalist Duk and media personality Mens are the main actors here. It was mainly on this show that Caroline and Wilders (and earlier Forum voor Democratie) were made popular, the VVD was promoted as a matter of course, and politicians and parties from the left-wing political spectrum were consistently attacked, often on spurious grounds.

Christian Democratic Appeal

The Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) climbed from 5 to 18 seats in 2025[18], but had long been polling at around 25 seats. The question widely discussed in the media was whether the leader of the CDA or that of GroenLinks-PvdA would (or should) become prime minister. In the Netherlands, too, the media increasingly cover elections as if they were exciting sports competitions in which only the winner matters. The polls indicate the interim results, to which the participants are asked to respond. Polls therefore largely determine the debate. The content has become increasingly secondary.

The appeal of the CDA’s lead candidate, physicist, religiously inspired, and relative newcomer Henri Bontenbal[19], seemed to lie in his reliability, seriousness, and calls for decency. After another two years of chaos and vulgar brawls, particularly by the right-wing populists around Geert Wilders, voters seemed to long for this. By voting for the New Social Contract in 2023, many had already made this clear. In the last days before the elections, however, Bontenbal quickly lost support according to the pollsters – the party ultimately finished only fifth. Opinion makers saw the cause as a mistake made by the party leader in an interview a week before the elections. Although he candidly admitted and corrected this mistake the very next day, his opponents widely publicized it in the media, apparently with success. The program Vandaag Inside once again played an important role in this.

The mistake was that the party leader had acknowledged that there is tension between two principles in the Dutch constitution: the principle of non-discrimination and freedom of education. The latter freedom means that social groups whose members share a particular religious belief can establish their own schools, which are financed by the State. In these schools, it could then be taught, for example, that homosexuality is a sin, a deviation, or otherwise a problem. The fundamental principle of the equality of all people is, of course, at odds with this doctrine. Instead of unequivocally declaring that the principle of non-discrimination takes precedence at all times (which he did the next day), the CDA leader hesitantly pointed out that values and principles regularly clash and that difficult decisions then have to be made.[20] According to the opinion makers on television talk shows, the most important medium, this mistake suddenly made clear that Bontenbal was not only decent, solid, and serious, but also Christian, and therefore a threat to personal freedom. For many viewers, this was reason enough to vote for another party.[21]

Of course, we don’t know whether voters actually thought and weighed things up in this way. They are not asked about their motives behind a particular change in voting behavior or mood; these are simply attributed to them. And even if people were to ask about motives, no clarity would be gained. The reason is simple: unfortunately, most people themselves hardly know what moves them. When asked about their motives, they may come up with an answer, but this answer is often nothing more than a retrospective construction. This is certainly true in a social constellation characterized by a lack of democratic discourse. In Bontenbal’s case, voters will probably have mainly picked up on the fact that he holds a dangerous, reprehensible view which, in the constantly quoted words of opinion maker Derksen, makes him unsuitable for the premiership.[22]

Democrats ’66

The left-liberal D66, the “winner” of the elections, went from 9 to 26 seats quite suddenly.[23] Never before had the largest party in the Netherlands won so few seats, illustrating the ongoing political fragmentation. D66’s victory also seems to have been largely due to coincidental circumstances. In the usual television debate between the leaders of the four largest parties on October 12, 2025, D66 was unexpectedly able to participate at the last minute. After right-wing politicians in Belgium had been threatened with an attack, Wilders decided to withdraw. He said he did not feel safe. However, he cheerfully participated in the following debates, so one can assume that his cancellation was mainly due to the expectation that playing the victim, the favorite role of populists, would once again work in his favor.

On October 12, D66 stood at around 14 seats. Perhaps because he had only been told at the very last minute that he would be allowed to participate, party leader Rob Jetten made a relaxed, energetic, and optimistic impression in the debate. The absence of the usually highly polarizing Wilders undoubtedly benefited the tone of the debate. According to polls, Jetten came across as by far the most convincing in the debate, together with CDA party leader Henri Bontenbal (who would make his decisive “mistake” a week later). Of the voters polled, 55% considered Bontenbal a reliable prime minister. Jetten and Frans Timmermans, the leader of GroenLinks-PvdA, received only 35% and 33% respectively. Approximately 65% of voters found Bontenbal likable. For Jetten, the percentage was 53. Many who switched parties indicated that Jetten’s performance had prompted them to do so.[24]

After this debate, D66 gained momentum, partly because, unlike the CDA, it did not make any “mistakes” in the final days or hours before the elections that could have been decisive for the outcome. Once you are on the rise, more and more voters join you: people like winners. Once you are in a downward spiral, there is often no way back: people do not like to be among the losers. Within two weeks, D66 doubled its support. And in the elections, D66 then became the “largest” party, relatively out of nowhere.

In keeping with its own tradition, D66’s 2025 program was moderate and pragmatic.[25] As early as the 1980s, it called itself “the reasonable alternative.” The title of the 2025 program was, after Barack Obama, “Yes, it can be done” (Het kan wél)”. The party supports, among other things, the European Union, fundamental social rights, an expansion of democratic participation opportunities, the free market, diversity, and a strict environmental policy. A typical pragmatic-optimistic proposal in 2025 was to build ten new cities to combat the housing shortage.

In what was seen as a masterstroke in D66’s recent election campaign, the theme of “nationalism” or “the Netherlands” was no longer allowed to be hijacked by right-wing populist parties. Due to its pro-European stance and the presence of numerous politicians and political leaders with previous careers abroad, D66 is seen as cosmopolitan in the Netherlands, which is not always an advantage in this country—people are quickly perceived as elitist, haughty, and, yes, out of touch with reality. This time, however, D66 explicitly declared its commitment to the Netherlands, as evidenced in particular by the highly visible presence of the Dutch tricolor at election rallies.

In what was seen as a masterstroke in D66’s recent election campaign, the theme of “nationalism” or “the Netherlands” was no longer allowed to be hijacked by right-wing populist parties. Due to its pro-European stance and the presence of numerous politicians and political leaders with previous careers abroad, D66 is seen as cosmopolitan in the Netherlands, which is not always an advantage in this country—people are quickly perceived as elitist, haughty, and, yes, out of touch with reality. This time, however, D66 explicitly declared its commitment to the Netherlands, as “evidenced” in particular by the highly visible presence of the Dutch tricolor at election rallies.

The party’s former campaign leader, Roy Klamer, elaborated on this in an interview: “Wilders in particular has claimed the flag until now. And Jetten has started to ‘reclaim’ it, saying: ‘That flag belongs to everyone, it also belongs to us. We just give it a different meaning, namely tolerance and a free country for everyone. According to Kramer, the flag campaign aroused interest: “People started to think: ‘Hey, that’s surprising. I’ve never seen a progressive party do that before. Normally, centrist parties such as D66 often suffer from boring campaigns, he observed. “But now people started to look: what’s going on there? Then it becomes exciting.” The campaign strategist went on to say: “There should always be an element of surprise. People just want variety, they want to hear something new. That applies to all parties, but of course also to D66”.[26]

Party for Freedom, Xenophobia, and Firewalls

Geert Wilders’ right-wing populist Party for Freedom (PVV) received the most attention in all domestic and foreign media. As stated in the introduction, there was widespread relief that it had not become the largest party and thus been declared the “winner.”

The PVV lost eleven of its 37 seats in 2025. In 2023, it had grown spectacularly from 17 to 37. Since its founding in 2005 (Wilders split from the right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) that year), the party has fluctuated between 10 and 20 seats.

This is probably the reservoir from which outright anti-immigration parties in the Netherlands can draw support. Such a reservoir exists in most Western democracies. In some countries (Hungary, Poland, East Germany), it is simply larger than in others (Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands). A significant portion of the Dutch electorate simply does not welcome foreigners, as Jesse Frederik (2024) shows, and this is not a new phenomenon.[27] People are concerned about national identity, demand that foreigners adapt more, believe that foreigners bring crime, fear for their own socio-economic position, assume that migration damages the economy and undermines welfare services, and therefore want to drastically limit migration. The main reason Dutch voters cite for voting for the PVV is “foreigners”.[28]

Why has this long-standing xenophobia only translated into the rise of right-wing populist parties in the last two or three decades? One reason is that, thanks to rising prosperity, many people can now afford to vote primarily according to their beliefs rather than their wallets.[29] The social democratic parties have been particularly affected by this. In earlier years, they were still able to attract people who were in favor of redistribution and against migration. Although many are still in favor of redistribution, it is no longer a priority. “The left-wing voter with anti-migration views has virtually disappeared,” Frederik observes: “Of the quarter of voters with the strongest preference for sending asylum seekers back, left-wing parties still managed to win over about 42 percent in the 1994 parliamentary elections. By the 2021 elections, only 14 percent remained.” Although the economic views of the left still enjoy widespread support, today it is almost exclusively the highly educated who vote for the left, while those with practical training have largely dropped out. The latter group is therefore mainly guided by cultural preferences.

Another reason for the rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands is that, in the past, there were often no parties that made anti-immigration sentiment the focus of their program. And to the extent that they did exist (think of Hans Janmaat’s Centrumpartij between 1982 and 1998), they were effectively excluded by the other parties and the media. However, this is no longer the case.

With regard to the media, significant changes have taken place over the last three decades: first, the licensing and growth of commercial broadcasters, and then the explosive spread of social media. Commercial broadcasting has only been permitted in the Netherlands since 1992. By 1995, it had already achieved a market share of around 45%. Since 2000, this has stabilized at around 60%. Public broadcasters were and are required to devote time to information, arts and culture, and politics. Their commercial competitors attract audiences mainly with entertainment and, in most cases, American series. Their success forced public broadcasters to adapt their programming in the same direction. Thirty years ago, this development led to political discussions: do citizens not have a duty to inform themselves? By appealing to a one-sided interpretation of the idea of “freedom,” opponents of public broadcasting managed to stifle this discussion (see Blokland 1997: chap. 7).

As a result of the spread of commercial broadcasting, it was no longer the public broadcaster that determined the content of broadcasts, but the consumer. The rise of Pim Fortuyn, the first populist explosion in the Netherlands, around the turn of the century can be explained in part by this: the media embraced this flamboyant, eloquent, humorous querulant, who, after eight years of “purple” Kok-cabinets (a coalition of VVD, PvdA, and D66), cabinets that mainly expressed a complacent “End of Politics,” brought some life and excitement to the political scene (see Blokland 2009: chap. 1).

The former gatekeepers who filtered what could be communicated disappeared completely in the case of social media. Social media also made numerous statements about foreigners “normal” and thus commonplace and accepted. Wilders and other populists, as we will see, made particular use of these social media.

Like the media, the other political parties no longer excluded the right-wing populists. According to opinion pollsters, the PVV’s growth in 2023 took place mainly in the last week before the elections, after the leader of the VVD, Dilan Yeşilgöz, suddenly declared, contrary to the strategy followed until then, that she would not rule out cooperation with the PVV. Many voters who in the past had not voted for the PVV for strategic reasons because it would have been a wasted vote, or who had not exercised their right to vote at all, now put their cross next to Wilders’ name. The latter is probably also because his views had been legitimized to an important extent by the VVD: if cooperation is conceivable, then the other party’s views are apparently no longer an insurmountable obstacle.

A “cordon sanitaire” or “firewall” around extreme parties and politicians is one of the most important pieces of advice that Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt formulate in their book How Democracies Die (2019) for democrats who want to oppose authoritarian populists. Dutch politics illustrates the plausibility of this advice. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt, Donald Trump could have been stopped if Republicans had taken their responsibility, as they had regularly done in the past, just like the Democrats. Instead, they opted for short-term electoral success, with all the long-term consequences that entailed. The growth of the PVV in 2023 and the chaos that ensued in the years that followed could also most likely have been prevented. It would have been sufficient for Yeşilgöz to consistently adhere to the previous strategy of both her own People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy and all other democratic parties.

Unworldly views of right-wing populist parties

According to the PVV, the Netherlands is on the brink of collapse and only a dramatic change of course could save the country. What is remarkable about the PVV’s success is that the Netherlands is one of the most economically and socially successful countries in the world. In all statistics relating to health, life expectancy, well-being, prosperity, education, or business climate, the country ranks at the top, usually alongside Scandinavian countries. [30] In many respects, the Netherlands is also in a much better position than countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, or France. Nevertheless, according to Wilders, the country needs to be completely overhauled.

The latter raises questions about the solutions that many politicians in these countries see as a way to combat populism in their countries. Much of what Bernie Sanders dreams of in the United States—and rightly so—has already been achieved to a significant extent in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, large numbers of Dutch people vote for right-wing populist parties that advocate a radical change of course. Apparently, populism is driven by forces other than the desire for greater social equality, universal healthcare, or better education.

To illustrate Wilders’ alarmist message, which focuses almost entirely on migration, it is worth quoting from one of his contributions to a parliamentary debate. The debate in question took place on August 27, 2025, after the Schoof Cabinet (which we will discuss later) had lost a coalition partner for the second time (the New Social Contract left the cabinet because the coalition partners did not allow harsher judgments on Israel’s actions in Gaza). Wilders made the following statement:

“Let’s be honest: what a mess, what an unbelievable mess!… The most important lesson, however unpleasant, is that since prehistoric times, there has been no greater bunch of political clowns and amateurs on this planet than the national sabotage club I mentioned earlier, or NSC. Everything they touch turns to rubble. First, they torpedo asylum policy. Then they commit political harakiri on themselves. And now, as they breathe their last breath, they want to destroy the Netherlands as well. Only Hamas still supports them… But let’s please focus less on problems far away and focus more on the problems here in our own country. People in the Netherlands can no longer walk the streets safely. They have to wait years for housing. For many people, groceries at the supermarket are unaffordable. We have to do something about that. Can we talk more about that here, more about our own country, our own people, and less about foreign countries? I think a lot of people would really appreciate that… This is what we want — take note, Mr. Schoof: very intensive border controls with immediate effect, a complete halt to asylum, a halt to family reunification, Ukrainian men back to Ukraine to help their country, Syrians back to Syria or to other Arab countries in the region, and no more asylum seekers’ centers, but closing existing ones…

Back in October 2023 [when elections were held], it was five minutes to midnight. Now it’s half past midnight. The country is falling apart. The borders are open. The country is becoming less safe. People can’t find housing. Groceries are still unaffordable… We’ve seen where it leads when you don’t know who’s entering your country. You get murder and manslaughter. You get anti-social behaviour. You get nothing but misery. People are fed up with it… So I say to everyone at home: watch who you vote for, because this is actually your last chance before things go completely wrong, and that chance lies with my party…

Women and girls no longer dare to walk the streets at night. It is completely unsafe in the Netherlands. This year, we are spending 9 billion euros on the reception of asylum seekers and Ukrainians — a total of 9 billion euros![31] What could we have done with that money? What could we have done for the Netherlands, for groceries, for extra police officers? We could have done so many things! … As I said, the Netherlands is becoming one big asylum seeker center. There is hardly a village or town left… We have more asylum seeker centers than hospitals in the Netherlands. It’s really beyond belief, and it goes on and on and on. This has to stop…

On October 29 [the date of the new elections in 2025], people at home in the Netherlands will have the opportunity to try again. This is the last chance, because, once again, the Netherlands is on the brink of collapse… Immigrants — every Dutch person, and certainly every woman, notices this every day — are simply overrepresented. These are not only asylum seekers; they are also members of the first, second, third, or fourth generation in the Netherlands… It is often hell for women, Dutch people, homosexuals, or anyone else… Go to a movie theater on a Friday night somewhere in a big city. Walk through the shopping center. Take a walk through Rotterdam on a Saturday. You’ll think you’re in Rabat. I’ve said it before: the Netherlands is no longer the Netherlands.”[32]

In 2023, Wilders achieved a huge election victory, as mentioned above. His program points in that year included: a ban on the Koran, Islamic schools, and mosques (which is contrary to the Dutch constitution), the complete closure of the borders to migrants and refugees (which is contrary to EU treaties), leaving the European Union (which would hit the open economy of the Netherlands even harder than it hit the economy of Great Britain), the abolition of public broadcasting, the cessation of all foreign aid, withdrawal from the UN climate agreement, an end to the transition to renewable energy, an end to support for Ukraine, lowering the retirement age, and reducing taxes.[33]

In an attempt to make himself more eligible for public office, Wilders avoided some of his most extreme proposals from the past (such as leaving the European Union) in 2025. However, Wilders still managed to make the issue of migration the focus of the elections that year. His ‘contributions’ to the debate on the existing political situation, quoted above, illustrate this. This is despite the fact that migration in the Netherlands is, or should be, of relatively minor importance compared to a few years ago and compared to the other problems the country is struggling with (nitrogen and the environment, housing shortage, defense, political disinterest, aging population, social and intergenerational inequality – I will come back to this later).

In fact, many of the PVV’s positions are impractical, politically, constitutionally, or legally unfeasible, or extremely damaging to the Dutch social, economic, and political system. They regularly operate on the same level as Wilders’ 2009 proposal to introduce a tax (of €1,000 per year) on wearing a headscarf (“kopvoddentaks”) in order to combat the supposed Islamization of the Netherlands. However, the impracticability and unfeasibility of many of his proposals seem to be of secondary importance, not least to his voters. It is all about provocation, media attention, and stirring up indignation.

Social media and populism

A serious, substantive debate about Wilders’ proposals, which could test their rationality, is also largely impossible. Like most other populists, Wilders prefers to communicate with the world through his own social media channels and avoids substantive exchanges with journalists, experts, or political opponents. “The medium is the message,” Marshall McLuhan said back in 1964, and this certainly applies to social media. It lends itself perfectly to the populist message: short and powerful, attention-grabbing, black-and-white, funny, noisy.

Wilders’ presence on social media is therefore overwhelming. In a country with 18 million inhabitants, Wilders has 1.6 million followers on X (formerly Twitter), more than 550,000 followers on Facebook, and more than 310,000 on Instagram.[34] This puts him far ahead of all other Dutch politicians and parties, especially those on the left and in the center. Caroline van der Plas (BoerBurgerBeweging) ranks second on X with only 280,000 followers, and the social democratic Labor Party (PvdA) has no more than 144,000. On Facebook, Frans Timmermans (PvdA) ranks second with 177,000 followers. And on Instagram, second place is taken by Rob Jetten with 133,000 followers. The largest party on TikTok is the BoerBurgerBeweging with 115,000 subscribers, and on YouTube it is Forum voor Democratie with 191,000 subscribers and 133 million views. On YouTube, Wilders occupies second place with 35,000 subscribers and 19 million views. As these figures show, just like the AfD in Germany and Trump in the United States, right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands chose at an early stage to avoid traditional media and approach citizens directly and without filters. And with success. At the same time, Dutch parties and organizations from the center and the left are increasingly abandoning social media platforms such as X. X in particular is now widely perceived as an irreparably damaged populist platform dominated by disinformation, manipulation, and incitement.

The dominant presence of social media also creates an alternative reality in another way, undermining substantive exchanges of ideas. In the Netherlands, the “highlights” of parliamentary debates are increasingly being edited into clips designed to achieve maximum effect on social media. Many comments and interventions are now made with the intention of posting them on social media. Thus, a second reality is growing alongside that in parliament, once the highest body of civil debate: the reality of social media, in which parliamentary debate has been reduced to material for something else. As early as 2021, D66 MP Kees Verhoeven observed: “The House of Representatives has become a place where video material for social media is recorded… The debate in the plenary chamber no longer serves to exchange ideas or to assess a bill or proposal. For many members of parliament, it is primarily a place where they can record video material to post on social media”.[35]

This phenomenon is not limited to the Netherlands. Le Monde (August 12, 2025) recently wrote about “TikTok speeches” in the French parliament that were conceived solely for dissemination via social media: “The method is often the same: a brief intervention never exceeding two minutes, a few edits to remove hesitations, subtitles for viewers with the sound off, epic background music for those with the sound on and a few catchy lines. In recent years, many MPs have turned to social media, especially platforms like TikTok that favor vertical video formats optimized for smartphones.”[36]

What further makes Wilders difficult to grasp for his interlocutors is his undeniable talent for witty one-liners, one-liners that also do very well on social media. How can one construct a somewhat coherent argument when it is constantly interrupted by clever, though on second reading almost always spurious, objections? In general, Dutch politicians have so far been unable to find an answer to the question of how they should respond to Wilders’ provocations. If they do not respond, it gives the impression that they lack counterarguments and that Wilders is therefore right. If they do respond, they give the provocations more attention than they deserve and make Wilders more important and bigger. Frontal attacks are completely ineffective because Geert Wilders invariably and immediately assumes the role of victim, in good populist fashion, which almost always leads to electoral gains.

Addressing populists’ claims substantively seems, in most cases, a lost cause from the outset, because this substance can rarely be communicated in the form of a tweet or a TikTok and because it requires an intellectual effort on the part of citizens that many are unwilling to make. When there are 100,000 unemployed people, the populist argues that unemployment can be eliminated by sending 100,000 migrants across the border. It takes economic insight and analysis to understand that this calculation does not add up.

Supporters of the Party for Freedom

It is often assumed that the support base of right-wing populist parties consists of those who have lost out as a result of modernization, globalization, or urbanization. This is not usually the case. The PVV, for example, mainly draws its support from middle-income earners. Statistics Netherlands distinguishes three groups in society: 40 percent poor, 40 percent middle income, and 20 percent rich. Martijn Klerks observes in 2025: “In neighborhoods where Wilders wins, the number of poor people is around the national average, but about 45 percent of households belong to the middle income group in the country; only 15 percent are in the highest income group”. [37] Incidentally, these are not dramatic differences. Nor do they occur when looking at age: the PVV is evenly represented in all age categories. The same can be observed with regard to the region where PVV voters live, the urban or rural nature of their place of residence, their gender, and their labor market position: 59 percent of Dutch voters are employed, compared to 58 percent of PVV voters. However, it can be said that PVV voters have, on average, less education: in 2023, 19% of the Dutch population was “low” educated, compared to 29% of PVV voters; 44% of the population was “high” educated, compared to 24% of PVV voters.[38] The PVV’s support base is therefore quite comparable to that of the Alternative für Deutschland.[39] Not surprisingly, education appears to be the most effective remedy for populism.

People at the so-called bottom of society are most affected by the negative aspects of migration: they have to live alongside newcomers in their apartment buildings and on their streets, and they have to compete with newcomers in the housing and labor markets. Nevertheless, this does not mean that anti-migration parties receive support mainly from these people. Rather, it seems that especially people who are afraid of having to live with foreigners in the future are the ones who vote for anti-migration parties.

The lack of senior leadership in populist parties

Because the PVV had become the largest party in 2023, it was allowed, in accordance with Dutch tradition, to be the first to attempt to form a majority coalition. After difficult negotiations, it succeeded in July 2024: together with the VVD, BBB, and NSC, the PVV formed an extra-parliamentary cabinet led by the non-partisan former senior civil servant Dick Schoof. The PVV had to give up most of its policy positions in the process—they were not that important anyway. The other parties also refused to allow Wilders to become prime minister. The fear of reputational damage in the European Union and beyond probably played a major role in this. The leaders involved agreed to stay in parliament, from where Wilders then began to criticize the government via tweets as if he were an opposition party.

However, the PVV was allowed to appoint the Minister for Migration and nominated the extremely confident Marjolein Faber. She promised to implement the strictest migration policy ever in the European Union.

The PVV is not a traditional political party with members, member meetings, and democratic decision-making procedures. Its leader, Geert Wilders, is the only member and single-handedly makes all the decisions that need to be made in parties, including those about programs, candidates, and government officials. As a result, the PVV has no cadre of people who have gained experience in previous political positions and are slowly climbing to more responsible positions. This is a problem for most populist leaders. Donald Trump appointed Fox reporter Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, anti-vaccination activist Robert Kennedy Jr. as Secretary of Health and Human Services, and real estate developer Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner as his top diplomats.

The Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB) was given the Ministry of Agriculture and appointed the completely inexperienced Femke Wiersma as minister. The BBB also suffers from a lack of organization and qualified personnel: the “movement” (right-wing populists prefer to call themselves a “movement”) is of very recent origin, and people also interested in other topics than agriculture, do not become active in this “single-issue party.” As preparation for her position, minister Wiersma had, among other things, taken a course on “dealing with difficult people” back in 2011. Her biography further notes that in 2010 she participated in the reality TV show Farmer Wants a Wife (Boer Zoekt Vrouw) where she met her partner.[40] Wiersma promised to do nothing—after all, according to the BBB there was no environmental problem at all in the Netherlands—and she succeeded with flying colors.[41]

As remarked, Geert Wilders put forward his confidant, the lab technician and IT worker Marjolein Faber.[42] During her eleven-month tenure at the Ministry of Migration, she did not get any policy or legislation off the ground. She was particularly notable for her inflexibility and a long series of, usually senseless, conflicts with all other individuals and institutions active in this sector, including virtually the entire parliament.

For example, she refused to grant royal awards to five citizens who had made an extraordinary effort in their spare time to integrate newcomers. Faber is against migration and therefore also against citizens who, for example, selflessly give language lessons to migrants. The citizens to be distinguished had previously been appointed by an independent committee. It is customary for ministers to sign without further comment. In 2024, more than three thousand people received a ribbon[43], and ministers usually don’t have time to think about whether or not certain people are rightly awarded an award. These “royal ” awards from the Dutch state should of course also be as separate as possible from party political considerations. The necessary signature now had to come from the Prime Minister, breaking the “unit of cabinet policy ” (the government speaks only with one mouth). This odd episode dominated the political debates for about two weeks. This was no exception. Dutch politics is increasingly, and certainly in recent years, preoccupied with symbolic politics or simply nonsense. The diminishing competence of politicians is partly responsible for this (I will return to this): if one cannot talk about social issues with competence, but still has to fill the time, one pays more attention to trivialities and silliness.

Populism and the functioning of pluralist democracies

The failure of Minister Faber to establish any policy, let alone “the strictest asylum policy in Europe ”, was not explained solely by her, regularly almost comical incompetence. In addition, an explanation is that populists like Faber have difficulty understanding or are unwilling to accept that in an open pluralistic democracy policy is generally achieved in a lengthy negotiation process with a large number of stakeholders in politics and civil society. Policy develops incrementally during this never-ending exchange. In the Netherlands, Minister Faber had to take into account coalition members, the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Council of State (which tests proposed policy for constitutionality), the independent judiciary, the European Commission, international treaties, provinces, municipalities, as well as executive bodies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) and the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V). The presence of all these institutions is not evidence of the existence of a “deep state ” that frustrates the poor politician, but of a pluralistic democracy, which has deliberately spread power, enacted constitutions and entered into international treaties. However, the populist sees himself as the exclusive representative of the People and believes that he can pursue a stand-alone, uncompromising policy.[44] No consultation is held with others, others are not taken on board, the others are informed at most. The end result in a country like the Netherlands is (for the time being) that nothing is achieved.

After her term as minister, Faber published a book about her experiences with the telling title They Won’t Break Me (Mij Krijgen Ze Niet Klein. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2025). In it, in keeping with good populist practice, she attributes her failure entirely to others. On the back cover one can read: “No sooner had I begun than a hate machine of unprecedented proportions was set in motion. And it was not only about me as a person. From the outset, people were opposed to any possible change I might introduce. Nothing concrete was on the table yet, but it was already being made to seem as if I wanted to set half the world on fire. I was ridiculed, smeared, demonized. I became the most talked-about minister ever.”

The Schoof Cabinet and its Predecessor, Rutte IV

The Schoof Cabinet, formed after the 2023 elections, was in office from 4 July 2024 to 3 June 2025. On that day, Wilders withdrew his PVV because the other parties had not agreed to a list of ten non-negotiable demands for an even stricter asylum policy.[45] Like its predecessor, the cabinet thus fell largely on the issue of migration.

On 5 September 2025, the ministers from the New Social Contract then resigned because the Minister of Foreign Affairs from that party was not allowed by the other cabinet members to make stronger statements regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza. The contribution of Wilders to the parliamentary debate, cited earlier, was made in response to this. From that moment, the cabinet consisted only of the VVD and the Farmer Citizen Movement, together holding 30 of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives, further illustrating the current inability to form stable, broadly supported governments.

This caretaker cabinet remains in office until a new government is formed, which is expected to take at least until spring 2026. However, it is uncertain whether the parties will be able to form a government at all: political fragmentation makes the cooperation of an increasing number of parties necessary, and the VVD in particular has imposed blockades on other parties (especially PVV and GroenLinks-PvdA).

There is little to report on the Schoof government’s policies. Progress on any issue was blocked by constant internal disputes and sheer political incompetence. In practice, since the fall of the Rutte IV Cabinet on 7 July 2023, the Netherlands has not truly been governed. The last Rutte cabinet itself was short-lived—from 10 January 2022 to 7 July 2023—and was hardly known for decisiveness. Its collapse led long-serving Prime Minister Mark Rutte, in office since 2010, to move on to NATO.

It was the VVD, then polling strongly, that brought down the Rutte IV cabinet (a coalition of VVD, D66, CDA, and the small Christian party ChristenUnie) over an issue that ultimately proved largely symbolic. VVD leader Dilan Yeşilgöz sought to drastically limit so-called “family reunification,” particularly for those who had fled civil wars.[46] She argued that these reunifications had made asylum unmanageable, placing excessive strain on the housing market and the education system. She proposed capping the number at 2,400 people per year. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) figures, however, the VVD’s plan would have reduced arrivals by no more than roughly 1,300 people annually.

The total number of people immigrating to the Netherlands (302,000 in 2022) consists overwhelmingly of labor migrants and students from other EU countries.[47] Only about 15% are asylum seekers. In 2022, according to calculations by the UNHCR based on figures from Netherlands Statistics, roughly 4,263 family members of war refugees arrived in the Netherlands. In the compromise reached by the coalition partners in the cabinet—which the VVD deemed unacceptable—it was agreed that 3,000 people per year would be eligible for family reunification. The UNHCR concludes: “The cabinet fell over (among other things) a measure that would have reduced the number of people coming to the Netherlands by about 1,263 per year”. [48] A non-issue, then, but as noted, non-issues are increasingly dominating politics in the Netherlands and beyond.

People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy

The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), founded in 1948, has been part of coalition governments in the Netherlands since 1977. Between 1948 and 1972, it was also almost always part of the government. For a long time, the VVD consisted of two wings: a market-oriented conservative one and a cultural-liberal. As happened in the United States with the Republicans and in the United Kingdom with the Conservatives, the latter wing within the VVD has become increasingly weaker. Since the 1980s, the party has progressively embraced neoliberalism and cultural conservatism. Also, especially after the rise of populist parties on the right wing of the VVD, the party has more and more moved into populist territory.

A harbinger of the growing populist movement within the VVD was the cheeky, opportunistic Hans Wiegel, under whose leadership the VVD’s number of seats roughly doubled in the 1970s (from 15 to 30). He was the first politician to address what he called “the people at home” directly, by looking straight into the television camera and ignoring the questions asked by the journalist, thereby suggesting that, unlike the journalist on duty, he understood and represented “the people.”[49]

The VVD provided the prime minister from 2010 onwards in the form of the ever-smiling Mark Rutte, renowned for his social skills. In that year, the party grew from 22 to 31 seats. It then rose to 41 seats in 2012, the VVD’s peak. Four years later, it had 33 seats, and in 2021, it gained one additional seat. After Rutte’s departure, the decline began under the new leader Dilan Yeşilgöz, who made mistake after mistake: 24 seats in 2023 and 22 in 2025, which, given the disastrous predictions of the pollsters, was celebrated by her as a victory.

Yeşilgöz’s consistently poor assessments are remarkable. In 2023, she first brought down the fourth Rutte cabinet under false pretences, in the unjustified expectation that the VVD could look forward to an election victory. In the week before the elections, as noted, Yeşilgöz suddenly opened the door to Wilders’ PVV, resulting in the PVV winning instead of the VVD. She then entered into a disastrous coalition with the right-wing populist PVV and Farmer-Citizen Movement, as well as the New Social Contract, which, notably, focuses on constitutionality. After almost two years of political and administrative chaos, during the election campaign she ruled out cooperation not only with Wilders, but also with GroenLinks-PvdA.

The latter party and its leader, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Rutte II cabinet and former Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, were consistently equated by Yeşilgöz with Wilders and disavowed as radical, extreme, irresponsible, and a threat to the stability and prosperity of the Netherlands. Given the long democratic tradition of GroenLinks-PvdA, this rhetoric could be described as shameful. However, given the political instability that has existed for years and the need to finally form a functioning government, it is also irresponsible. Nevertheless, this image of the social democrats was successfully spread further by the aforementioned talk shows and their social media. Yeşilgöz’s strategy was presumably to motivate right-wing voters to vote for the VVD because, she argued, this was the only way to prevent Timmermans from becoming Prime Minister, which would be catastrophic for the country. The strategy worked insofar as the VVD lost only two of its 24 seats, while opinion polls until a week before the elections predicted a loss of up to ten seats. Yeşilgöz celebrated her second defeat in a row—in two years, the VVD lost a third of its support—as a victory.

The problem with Yeşilgöz’s strategy, however, is that the administrative chaos continued after the elections because without GroenLinks-PvdA it is impossible to form a stable, broadly supported government of the centrist parties. Under her leadership, the VVD has instead opted for a coalition of D66, CDA, VVD, and the next right-wing populist party that the VVD helped bring to power, JA21. Together, these parties only hold 75 of the 150 seats.

The continuous shift to the right in the last four decades of formerly conservative parties is perhaps one of the most important political developments of this period. The Republicans in the United States, the Conservatives in Great Britain, and the VVD previously had an eye for social cohesion and responsibility and stood for values such as gradualism, community, consultation, and tradition. First, this conservatism was exchanged for neoliberalism, an unbridled, globalized capitalism that greatly promoted social divisions and inequality and dissolved traditional values and communities. And then they increasingly found themselves in right-wing populist waters. The Christian Democrats in Germany would probably have followed the same path without Angela Merkel, but now seem to be catching up under Friedrich Merz.

The Right Answer 21

The aforementioned Right Answer 21, or JA21, is another example of frivolity on the part of both voters and elected officials. The party participated in the elections for the first time in 2021 and won three seats at the time. However, after the elections two representatives switched to the Farmer-Citizen Movement. In 2023, the party won only one seat. In 2025, though, it suddenly grew ninefold.

The founder and leader is Joost Eerdmans. He was successively a member of the CDA, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Eén NL, Leefbaar Rotterdam (the city where he became alderman), and Forum voor Democratie. He had a disagreement with the leader of the latter, also a right-wing populist party, after which he founded his own party. The other current members of parliament from JA21 have similar histories. Their backgrounds differ so much that it is expected that the party will continue to be marked by constant splits. The most prominent member is Ingrid Coenradie, who served as state secretary for the PVV in the Schoof cabinet for eleven months. She became known for not bowing to Wilders in a conflict with him, as is customary within the PVV. After her forced resignation, she joined JA21 and subsequently contributed significantly to the success of her new party through her frequent appearances on talk shows, to which she was apparently constantly invited.[50] Another important reason for this success is seen in the exclusion of Wilders, mainly by the VVD. This made JA21 a reasonable right-wing alternative, as this party used to present itself.[51]

However, JA21’s views hardly differ from those of Wilders. If one excludes the PVV, there is little reason to embrace JA21. JA21 also wants to drastically limit migration, sees Islam as a major threat to Dutch culture, focuses on large-scale nuclear energy instead of solar and wind energy, wants to reopen the gas fields in Groningen, is EU-skeptical, wants to lower taxes, wants harsher punishments for criminals, wants more direct democracy, and wants to get rid of “rigid nitrogen rules.” [52] The main difference is probably that JA21 is more pragmatic, which is also explained by the administrative experience at lower levels of people such as Eerdmans and Coenradie.

Forum for Democracy

The next right-wing populist party to benefit from the VVD’s strategy was Forum for Democracy (FvD). The party was founded in 2016 by Thierry Baudet and, like other new populist parties, quickly rose to prominence. Baudet was new, young, eloquent, well-dressed, cultured, and expressed great contempt for the “incumbent elite.” He is against the EU and in favor of national sovereignty, direct democracy, and referendums. He denies that humans have any influence on the climate and is therefore opposed to climate measures and the promotion of alternative energy. He was against the government’s coronavirus measures (lockdowns, masks, vaccination), is friends with the Tate brothers and endorses many of their views[53], and is pro-Russia and pro-Trump. Over the years, he made increasingly remarkable statements in parliament and elsewhere, which led many former allies to leave the FvD.[54] For example, he strongly doubted that the Americans had ever been to the moon, suggested that the Americans themselves were responsible for 9/11, claimed that George Soros was behind the coronavirus, linked the coronavirus measures to the Holocaust (for which he was subsequently convicted by a court), claimed that a “Great Reset” was underway in which global elites were trying to expand their power through deliberately created crises[55], and stated that the entire war in Ukraine was an American conspiracy against Russia.

In 2017, the FvD won two seats in the House of Representatives, and two years later, it scored no less than 12% in the Senate. In 2021, the FvD grew to eight seats in the House of Representatives, fell to three seats in 2023, and in 2025, as an alternative to the PVV (which is less radical in many respects but excluded by the VVD), it was able to grow again to seven seats. Do all his voters endorse his views, insofar as they themselves have views, of course? This is doubtful. Many simply have no idea what the FvD’s views are, and insofar as they have taken note of them, they probably consider this provocateur to be entertaining. His presence certainly livens things up a bit.

In short, experiences in the Netherlands show once again that attempting to defeat right-wing populist parties by adopting their programs in a slightly watered-down form only legitimizes these parties and their views and shifts the entire political spectrum to the right. In the Netherlands, thanks in part to the efforts of the most recent leaders of the VVD, there are now five right-wing populist parties: the PVV, Ja21, BBB, FvD, and the VVD itself. Contrary to what many foreign commentators wanted to see, the defeat of the PVV in 2025 was hardly a loss for right-wing populism in the Netherlands: in 2023, the PVV, BBB, VVD, JA21, and FvD together won 72 (of 150) seats. In 2025, this was only four fewer. It is difficult to claim that voters (and the VVD leadership) had learned much from the political and administrative chaos of recent years.

GreenLeft–Labour Party

The loss of almost all left or progressive parties also shows that populism is by no means on the decline in the Netherlands.[56] The merged social democratic Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) and Groen Links (GL) lost five of their twenty-five seats. The hope was that the merger would create a broad left-wing popular party, but instead, the left shrank even further. In the 1980s, the PvdA still had around 50 seats. Since then, it had slowly declined to a low of nine seats in 2017 and 2019. GroenLinks, which was first represented in parliament in 1989, regularly achieved great success in opinion polls, but rarely in elections. In 2017, it won 14 seats and four years later eight. This motivated the merger, with the first result being 25 seats in 2023 – eight more than the parties had won jointly in 2021. Instead of continuing to grow, support then declined further. Developments in Germany concerning the SPD and the Grünen mirror those of their sister parties in the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands, Catholic leader W.H. Nolens famously declared that only in “extreme necessity,” such as during times of war or national disaster, should the Social Democrats be allowed to govern.[57] This statement dates from 1922 and was considered bold at the time, given that the bishops had completely ruled out cooperation with the “godless” socialists in a pastoral letter of 1918. Nolens’ wish has largely come true. Indeed, the Social Democrats in the Netherlands have been unable or barely able to participate in coalition cabinets. This only happened after the Second World War (1945–1956), when the reconstruction of the Netherlands required industrial peace, and then briefly at the beginning of the 1970s (1973–1977), when many hoped, or feared, that the progressive revolution was about to break out.[58]

In the 1990s, social democrats believed they had found the solution to their continued exclusion from government power: inspired by the narrative of “the end of ideology,” “the end of history,” and even “the end of politics,” they largely adopted the neoliberal program of deregulation, privatization, commercialization, and austerity.[59] Social Democratic leader Wim Kok declared that he had “stowed away the ideological feathers” and had “opened the windows”. He was first rewarded by the CDA with a place in government (1989–1994) and then by the VVD, formerly the absolute opposite of the PvdA, and D66 with the premiership (1994–2002). In the second Rutte cabinet (2012–2017), the PvdA even ruled alone with the VVD, for which it was rewarded at the elections with a historic loss of seats (from 38 to 9).

Here too, the development of the PvdA hardly differs from that of the SPD under Gerhard Schröder in Germany or Labour under Tony Blair in England. In Germany, too, the SPD has never really recovered from its participation in a grand coalition with the CDU. It is striking that the SPD, particularly in the eastern states of the former GDR, no longer plays any significant role and, together with the Grünen, has become the object of hatred par excellence for many voters. The explanation is probably that citizens had expected the Social Democrats to protect them from the personal and social consequences of the abrupt introduction of capitalism, but did not receive this protection (Blokland 2025: chap. 6).

This is not the place to discuss in detail the decline of social democrats in the Netherlands and elsewhere (I have done so in the books mentioned in the previous footnote). In part, they have been victims of their own success: the elimination of the most acute forms of poverty and social inequality. However, the rise of populism is also partly linked to the choices made by the social democrats in the 1990s.

The Kok cabinets in the Netherlands distinguished themselves through depoliticization and a highly technocratic style of government, in line with the end-of-politics sentiment. They helped pave the way for the first populist explosion in the Netherlands: The Pim Fortuyn revolt in 2002 (Blokland 2009). The suggestion that, all things considered, the Netherlands was “finished” and that only an endless series of minor policy adjustments awaited us, left the traditional supporters of social democracy feeling abandoned. No one expected anything else from the conservative market liberals of the VVD, but the fact that the social democrats neglected the issues of social equality and justice was unforgivable. Equally unforgivable was the abandonment of social democracy’s traditionally visionary character: the promise of a better life in a better society. This promise, social democratic leaders seemed to believe, had been fulfilled. When on top of this the Social Democrats began to focus more and more on identity politics and became a mouthpiece for every possible minority, rather than the majorities (at the bottom) of society, the electoral exodus became unstoppable.

In addition, the narrative of the end of politics provided ample opportunity for disinterest, irresponsibility, frivolity, and entertainment. When the country is in a state of completion and former political opponents can form governments together, what else is there for voters to be concerned about? Why not vote for someone who provides some entertainment? What does his or her program matter? It is all just a political game.

It goes without saying that the relativistic postmodernism that was extremely popular among the left at the time provided additional intellectual justification for this mindset.[60]

Coincidences and Shifts in Public Mood

Dutch politics has increasingly come to depend on coincidences and fleeting, transient moods. Had Pieter Omtzigt not risen to prominence during the “childcare benefits scandal,” the NSC would never have come into existence. Had he not made the mistake of entering a cabinet with the bully Wilders, the NSC might have become the largest party in the Netherlands instead of collapsing entirely. Had Wilders not withdrawn from the traditional debate between the lead candidates of the four largest parties, Jetten would not have been invited, and D66 would probably not have become the largest party. Had the political leader of the VVD not suddenly declared, just days before the 2023 elections, that cooperation with Wilders could not be ruled out, the PVV would not have become the largest party in 2023 and the Schoof cabinet would never have been formed. Had the CDA’s lead candidate not been asked, a few days before the elections, whether there was a tension between the principle of equality and freedom of education, he would now have been prime minister. And had a handful of influential talk-show hosts not chosen to elevate a personal favorite, parties such as BBB, JA21, and FvD would have remained entirely marginal phenomena.

The overall volatility can also be illustrated by the phenomenon of the “floating voter” — that is, the voter who has not yet decided how to vote. One week before the 2025 elections, only 18 percent of voters were already certain of their choice. In 2023, this figure was 26 percent. Admittedly, in 2025 more than half of voters (55 percent) expressed a clear preference for a party, but for the remainder (45 percent) many different outcomes were still possible.[61] In 2023, 15 percent of voters decided how they would vote on election day itself, while 14 percent made their decision on the day before the election (a combined total of 29 percent). More than half (52 percent) stated that they had only made up their minds in the final week before the election. [62]

As a consequence, voter switching between parties was enormous. Only 60 percent of those who voted for GreenLeft–Labour in 2023 voted for the party again two years later. For the PVV this figure was 52 percent, for the VVD 56 percent, for the SP 37 percent, and for D66 — unsurprisingly — 66 percent. Even among the strongly religiously motivated electorate of the Christian Union (ChristenUnie) only 57 percent remained loyal. Of those who voted for the BBB in 2023, just 24 percent cast their vote for the party again in 2025. And only two percent of the NSC’s supporters from the previous election chose that party for a second time.

An increasingly incompetent and powerless legislature

One consequence of the sudden rises and falls of political parties, of ever shorter periods of government[63], and of electoral mood swings is that members of parliament now serve for increasingly shorter periods of time and possess ever less political experience. As an inevitable result, the power and influence of parliament — and with it that of the voter — are being seriously undermined. Voters believe they have freed themselves from the habit of almost always voting for the same party and assume that by following their immediate preferences they are exercising greater influence over political decision-making. In practice, however, the opposite has occurred.

After the 2017 elections, 71 of the 150 members of parliament left office; in 2021 this number was 68, in 2023 no fewer than 80, and in 2025 another 55. In addition, further representatives departed in the interim between elections.[64]

As a rule, it takes three to four years before members of parliament become reasonably familiar with parliamentary procedures and with the government policies within their portfolios. On average, however, they currently serve only three years in parliament.[65] If one calculates the average on the eve of the 2025 elections while excluding the five longest-serving members, the figure amounts to approximately 2.4 years. Based on the information provided by the House of Representatives regarding its members[66], it can be estimated that after the 2025 elections only about 20 percent will have more than five years of parliamentary experience.

As in most other democracies, Dutch politicians in the past typically reached parliament only after a long trajectory through their party and various lower administrative bodies. This process of learning and screening ensured that incompetent or otherwise questionable party members were halted or eliminated before advancing to the top. The significance of this learning and screening process has, however, diminished. Traditional parties have lost many members and now draw from an increasingly limited pool of candidates. The newer parties, which appear and disappear with growing frequency, naturally lack members with extended political experience. As a result, today more individuals without substantial political or administrative experience enter parliament. Frequently, they seem to regard their position primarily as an interesting interim step in their career. Few still perceive politics as a vocation. Those who do project such an ethos are, in a populist political climate, quickly dismissed as opportunistic careerists. The manner in which the lead candidate of GroenLinks-PvdA in 2025, Frans Timmermans, and that of D66 in 2021, Sigrid Kaag, were treated in public and political debate is illustrative.[67]

One might, of course, argue that members of parliament increasingly represent ordinary voters, which could be seen as an expression of democracy: like most voters, they often have little idea of what they are talking about. It is, however, questionable whether this ought to be regarded as progress.

The lack of knowledge and experience is further exacerbated by the fact that political parties in parliament are becoming increasingly smaller. In a system of representative democracy without an electoral threshold (Germany, by comparison, has a five percent threshold), the political landscape fragments more and more, resulting in a growing number of parties in an already relatively small parliament. In 2025, the parliament comprises 15 parties, seven of which hold three or fewer seats (thus representing at most two percent of the votes cast). The consequence is that individual members of parliament are less able to specialize and must take responsibility for an ever wider range of policy areas and issues. Their expertise continually diminishes, as does their capacity to exercise effective oversight of the government.

Members of parliament could be supported in their work by their own staff and by political parties with, for example, research bureaus that provide them with information, analyses, and ideas. In the Netherlands, however, the number of staff members is limited—depending on the party and the position within the party, between one and at most three assistants. By contrast, the more than 700 members of the German Bundestag have, on average, seven or eight staff members at their disposal.[68]

The research institutes of the various political parties in the Netherlands are relatively insignificant. The Wiardi Beckman Foundation, the research institute of the social-democratic PvdA, employs five staff members.[69] The Telders Foundation of the People’s Party for Democracy has six employees.[70] By comparison, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands employs nearly 1,600 people in total.[71] The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung of the Christlich Demokratische Union has a comparable number of staff.[72] Although a significant proportion of these employees are active in the federal states and abroad, the number of staff in Berlin and Bonn—approximately half of the total—produces a volume of information and analyses that is inconceivable in the Netherlands.

Comparable remarks can be made on the relative sizes of the administrative staffs of the Dutch Tweede Kamer, which has approximately 600 employees, and the German Bundestag, which employs around 3,000 people. Such a staff assists parliamentarians in substantively and organizationally overseeing the government. It helps formulate legislation, provides information and compiles documentation, and manages parliamentary procedures. In international comparison, the Dutch staff is relatively small. In 2021, the Council for Public Administration(Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur) therefore advocated “for a substantial strengthening of administrative support for Tweede Kamer members, perhaps even a doubling.” However, it was noted that politicians were hesitant to implement this desired strengthening of parliament, stating, “They did not want to make themselves vulnerable to the accusation that politicians are arranging things well for themselves.”[73]

The presence of scientific input does not, of course, automatically imply that government policy in Germany is significantly more coherent or well-designed than in the Netherlands. Before more substantiated insights and analyses can influence government policy, a considerable number of hurdles must be overcome. In Germany, too, this process often fails, and one can frequently only be amazed by how the leading political parties and the government in general have ignored or neglected a wide range of problems and issues. Digitalization, demographic ageing, the pension system, defense, the integration of newcomers, infrastructure, and education are among the examples.

Conclusion

Dutch politics now resembles a pinball machine more than a polis that, after careful consideration, translates preferences, values, and visions into government policy. Political leaders, political parties, and governments come and go at an unprecedented pace. Voters are changing their preferences more and more often, and increasingly at the very last moment. More and more parties are represented in parliament with ever smaller support bases. Representatives of the people are exercising their mandate for ever shorter periods and, with ever less knowledge of the issues, are exercising ever less control over the government. Parliament and government are increasingly populated by people with inadequate political competence and professional knowledge. The influence of opinion makers and other media personalities in talk shows and social media increases in inverse proportion to the disinterest, indifference, and political incompetence of voters. Parliament is no longer the temple of democratic deliberation, but increasingly serves as a recording studio for pre-planned social media clips. Governments are increasingly perceived as powerless to decisively solve pressing social problems. In fact, there has been no effective governance for years, and the main reason why the country has not descended into chaos is probably the steadfastness of the civil service, civil society, and the European Union.

Politicians are certainly to blame for the current political malaise. But in a democracy, citizens are ultimately responsible. Many, however, seem pretty indifferent to it all. Following Hannah Arendt, one could argue that the greatest threat to democracy comes not from radical minorities who hate and divide, but from an indifferent majority or mass of atomized individuals. Detached and passive people, in other words, who do not experience a shared reality and do not participate in public life.[74]

Indifference is linked to irresponsibility. People do not feel responsible for public affairs or general interests, do not get involved, do not inform themselves, and make choices that are so frivolous that they would be deeply ashamed of making such choices in their personal lives. This can be seen in voter behavior. Many people vote for parties and candidates without bothering to inform themselves about their backgrounds, positions, and programs. Many vote for parties and candidates that objectively go against their own interests and goals.[75] People also often seem to vote out of sheer contrariness, boredom, and a need to be disruptive. It is observed that those who do inform themselves and engage, and who therefore feel more or less superior, reject or even despise people who vote for candidates and parties that oppose the entire democratic system. And that is why people do it anyway. They give everyone the middle finger in an act of adolescent rebellion. It is cathartic.

Electoral irresponsibility is not a new phenomenon. Along with many other thinkers who pondered democracy at the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter had few illusions about the average voter (Blokland 2006). They were, in principle, in favor of democracy, but only a democracy with as few choices as possible for citizens. For a democracy, it was sufficient to be able to choose between competing elites, who would replace each other every few years. However, in order to prevent political instability or disintegration, the values and goals of these elites had to overlap to a large extent. The aim was to be able to vote out a failing or freedom-threatening government and replace it with another. Giving citizens the opportunity to exert real influence over who would belong to the elites or what policies should be pursued would only open the door to demagogues, chaos, and authoritarianism.

After the war, and certainly from the 1960s onwards, confidence in the political competence of citizens increased (Blokland 2018). People had learned from the collapse of democracies in the interwar period. A steadily rising level of education also gave cause for optimism. Moreover, individualization led citizens to believe more and more in their own abilities to determine politics. They were told and they believed they had become politically literate.

Perhaps it is high time that they put this political literacy and maturity to the test.

Endnotes

[1] The journalist of Le Monde reported on the elections in a more balanced manner. “In the Netherlands, an uncertain victory against populism: Although Rob Jetten, who narrowly defeated Geert Wilders and his far-right party, has restored a measure of hope in the face of the rise of populist movements in the Netherlands and across Europe, forming a coalition is shaping up to be extremely complex” (November 14, 2025).

The result was seen as a glimmer of hope for all European democracies being destabilized by populist parties, but the newspaper also pointed to an “undeniable democratic malaise.” According to the paper, populism in the Netherlands was by no means defeated and may merely have been temporarily halted.

[2] https://allecijfers.nl/verkiezingsuitslagen/nederland/; https://app.nos.nl/nieuws/tk2025/.

[3] https://nos.nl/collectie/13902/artikel/2465084-enquetecommissie-gaswinning-rampzalig-voor-groningers-nederland-heeft-ereschuld.

[4] https://www.rd.nl/artikel/1032187-omtzigt-met-31-zetels-aan-kop-in-nieuwe-peiling

[5] https://www.ipsos-publiek.nl/actueel/io-zetelpeiling-bbb-veruit-de-grootste.

[6] https://nos.nl/collectie/13999/artikel/2578527-verkiezingsprogramma-bbb-minder-asiel-klimaatregels-en-symboolpolitiek. https://bbbinternationaal.nl/bbb-de-politieke-partij/.

[7] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20231116-2.

[8] https://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/nl212414-ontwikkeling-veestapel-op-landbouwbedrijven-1980-2024

[9] https://www.ipsos-publiek.nl/actueel/huisdierenpeiling-steeds-minder-vijvervissen-en-pluimvee-in-nederland/.

[10] https://www.nieuweoogst.nl/nieuws/2024/11/06/aantal-werknemers-in-agrarische-sector-neemt-af-ziekteverzuim-stijgt. https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2025/08/werkloosheid-in-januari-toegenomen.

[11] Of course, it is impossible to define rural areas unequivocally. Statistics Netherlands (CBS) uses the term “population center” to measure rural areas. This is defined as “a morphologically contiguous area with a group of buildings with a clearly recognizable street pattern, which is predominantly inhabited by people.” A minimum threshold of 25 dwellings or 50 inhabitants is used. Based on this definition, the CBS states: “On January 1, 2021, almost 93 percent of the Dutch population lived in a population center. The remaining 7 percent (almost 1.3 million inhabitants) lived outside the centers, in scattered houses in rural areas or in villages or hamlets with ribbon development, for example along a canal.” https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/diversen/2024/bevolkingskernen-in-nederland-2021.

[12] The CBS notes the following for the period between 2011 and 2021: “In more than half (55 percent) of the centers with up to 1,000 inhabitants, the number of inhabitants declined. This also applied to 45 percent of the centers with 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants.” In the north of the Netherlands, these figures were even more striking. See: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2025/12/2011-2021-bevolkingskrimp-vooral-in-de-kleinere-kernen.

[13] At the end of 2022, the trade journal for marketers Adformatie discussed the reason for her success. The title of the article is telling: “Caroline van der Plas is an authentic marketing product, and that works in the Netherlands. [Her] popularity is skyrocketing, just like the Farmer Citizen Movement in the polls… She has been deliberately pushed… and then hyped in a number of media outlets” (August 10, 2022).

[14] https://www.eur.nl/nieuws/eur-studenten-onderzoeken-talkshows-wie-er-aan-het-woord-en-hoe-lang?; https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2025/10/17/wie-is-er-aan-het-woord-in-de-talkshows-en-hoelang-a4909626

[15] As a political commentator and objective political expert, Mens has appeared on programs such as Op1, HLF8, BNR Nieuwsradio, Khalid & Sophie, Goedemorgen Nederland, De Oranjezomer, Jan-Willem Start Op!, De Slimste Mens, Vandaag Inside, and De Spindoctors. He also has a podcast and even tours the Netherlands with a theater program to explain politics to the people.

[16] See, among others: Fröhlich, Paulina and Johannes Hillje. 2020. Die Talkshow-Gesellschaft. Repräsentation und Pluralismus in öffentlich-rechtlichen Polit-Talkshows. Berlin: Das Progressive Zentrum. Goldmann, Fabian. 2020. Gäste in TV-Talkshows: Mehr Vielfalt bei der Auswahl, bitte!“ Deutschlandfunk Kultur.

[17] https://www.vandaaginside.nl/

[18] The Christian Democrats, who accounted for half of the votes in the 1950s and 1960s and a third in the 1970s and 1980s, still won more than 40 seats in 2002, 2003, and 2006. Since 2010, they have fluctuated between 15 and 20 seats, reaching a low point of five seats in 2023 after a disastrous campaign. Approximately five seats came from the NSC in 2025. Four seats from the NSC went to D66.

[19] https://www.parlement.com/biografie/drs-h-henri-bontenbal#p5

[20] The interview excerpt in question is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKJr_XGD9HY.

[21] The number of deliberately created posts in (social) media is countless. See, among many others: https://www.ad.nl/politiek/bontenbal-baalt-van-uitleg-over-homo-acceptatie-op-refoscholen-dit-was-niet-goed-ik-maak-fouten~a331590b/; https://www.mediacourant.nl/2025/10/johan-derksen-dreigt-henri-bontenbal-te-omringen-met-vi-homos/; https://www.vandaagenmorgen.nl/nieuws/12498/botsende-grondwetsartikelen-in-nieuwsuur-kostten-bontenbal-vijf-virtuele-zetels-video.

[22] Derksen stated on television: “I believe that Bontenbal should no longer be allowed to become prime minister… This should be reason enough for any respectable party to say: we will no longer work with the CDA. I believe this is unacceptable! He constantly criticizes the unconstitutional proposals put forward by Wilders, but he is doing exactly the same thing. This is completely unacceptable.” See: https://socialnieuws.nl/2025/10/22/henri-bontenbal-choqueert-met-uitspraak-hij-mag-nu-geen-premier-meer-worden/.

[23] In 2021, D66 still had 24 seats, just as it did in 1994. Since its founding, D66 has alternated between election victories and disastrous defeats (from 17 to 6 in 1982; from 24 to 14 in 1998; from 3 to 10 in 2010).

[24] https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/ipsos-ieno/d66-groeit-door-na-rtl-debat.

[25] https://d66.nl/.

[26] https://eenvandaag.avrotros.nl/artikelen/terugclaimen-van-nederlandse-vlag-en-optimisme-zo-zag-de-campagne-van-d66-eruit-161793. Also see: https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/hoe-d66-met-radicaal-rechts-de-strijd-aanging-om-de-nederlandse-vlag-die-vlag-hoort-bij-iedere-nederlander.

[27] Frederik bases his findings partly on the National Voter Survey (https://www.dpes.nl/), which has been collecting data on the socio-political views of Dutch citizens since 1971: https://decorrespondent.nl/15115/waarom-de-pvv-zo-groot-werd-en-nee-niet-door-geschrapte-buslijnen-guur-neoliberalisme-of-groeiende-ongelijkheid/11329427-c34e-0037-2754-969f6eb43828.

[28] Of the 40 percent of Dutch people who have the least sympathy for the PVV, only about 20 percent believe that there are “too many” foreigners living in the Netherlands. Of the 20 percent of Dutch people who have the most sympathy for the PVV, no less than 80 percent share this view. At the same time, the European Social Survey cited by Frederik shows that, on average, Dutch people have become more positive about foreigners over the past 20 years: more than in the past, they believe that migrants make a positive contribution to culture, the economy, and the living environment. Other research (in particular the panel study by https://www.lissdata.nl/) also shows that there is no sign of a rise in xenophobia. It also appears that people’s opinions hardly change over the years.

[29] According to Statistics Netherlands, only about 3.1% of the Dutch population lived below the poverty line in 2023 (https://longreads.cbs.nl/nederland-in-cijfers-2025/hoeveel-mensen-waren-arm/). The definitions of “poverty” have changed somewhat over time. Nevertheless, it can be observed that poverty, measured in various ways, has declined almost continuously since the 1980s. In 1985, 22.5% of households were still “at risk of poverty” (https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/diversen/2021/inkomens-verdeeld-40-jaar-in-vogelvlucht/6-risico-op-armoede).

[30] See, for instance: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2024/23/brede-welvaart-nederland-een-na-hoogste-van-de-eu; https://imglobalwealth.com/articles/which-nations-score-highest-for-quality-of-life-in-2025; https://factsinstitute.com/ranking/human-development-index; https://data.worldhappiness.report/country/NLD; https://www.oecd.org/en/data/tools/well-being-data-monitor/better-life-index.html.

[31] In 2024, the total national budget of the Netherlands amounted to 434 billion. Of this, approximately 6.6 billion (1.52% of the budget) went to the reception (and procedures) of asylum seekers and Ukrainians. The costs for the latter group amounted to almost three billion (https://www.rijksfinancien.nl/miljoenennota/2024/2153142). In addition, six billion euros in financial aid was granted to Ukraine (https://www.rijksfinancien.nl/financieel-jaarverslag/2024/8112649). These payments could, incidentally, also be booked under defense.

[32] August 27, 2025 debate in the House of Representatives on “the political situation that has arisen”

(TK 108-2) (https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/plenaire_vergaderingen/details/activiteit?id=2025A05771).

[33] See his election program “Nederlanders weer op 1” (Dutch Again on 1): https://www.pvv.nl/images/2023/PVV-Verkiezingsprogramma-2023.pdf.

[34] (https://tjitze.nl/welke-politieke-partijen-uit-de-tweede-kamer-hebben-de-meeste-volgers-op-social-media).

[35] https://www.nporadio1.nl/nieuws/politiek/d2337c78-6de3-43d2-b81e-4144055fdb83/tweede-kamer-is-een-plek-geworden-waar-videomateriaal-voor-sociale-media-wordt-opgenomen. The phenomenon was investigated in more detail by members of the Utrecht University Faculty of Humanities and Data School. They analyzed nearly 50 million messages on Twitter and Telegram and observed, among other things, that the clips contributed significantly to social polarization by consistently showing only one side of the story and constantly demonizing the opponent: https://www.uu.nl/en/news/data-research-shows-interaction-between-debates-in-the-dutch-house-of-representatives-and-social.

[36] (https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/08/11/a-l-assemblee-nationale-la-multiplication-des-interventions-tiktok-fait-debat_6628048_823448.html).

[37] https://www.ad.nl/politiek/stembureaucijfers-onthullen-geheim-van-d66-en-nog-vier-opvallende-feitjes~af92f84d/. Retrieved December 10, 2025.

[38] Ipsos. 2023. Verkiezingsonderzoek Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2023. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2023-12/Kiezersonderzoek%20TK23_v1.0.pdf. Retrieved on December 8, 2023.

[39] See: Decker, Kiess en Brähler (2023), Sturzbecher en Pöge (2023), and Neu, Küpper und Luhmann (2023).

[40] https://www.parlement.com/biografie/fm-femke-wiersma.

[41] Under the title “Delete, delay, block”, Esther Rosenberg and Derk Stokmans reconstruct in NRC-Handelsblad (December 5, 2025) “how Femke Wiersma protected the interests of intensive livestock farming at the expense of almost every other social interest”.

[42] https://www.parlement.com/biografie/mhm-marjolein-faber-van-de-klashorst.

[43] https://www.lintjes.nl/.

[44] Hier is een Engelse vertaling van je tekst:

It is characteristic that Minister Faber attempted to invoke the “State of Emergency Law” (Staatsnoodrecht). Declaring a “state of emergency” regarding migration and asylum would have enabled her to implement measures without further consultation and to disregard agreements within the European Union. Under Dutch constitutional law, however, she was required to provide a “substantive justification” for this. She proved incapable of doing so.

[45] In this “ten-point plan” by Wilders from May 2025, it was proposed, among other things, that the Dutch borders should be completely closed to asylum seekers within a few weeks; that the Dutch military should be deployed to guard the borders; that all Syrians with temporary residence permits should be sent back; and that family reunification for people with refugee status should be ended (https://nos.nl/artikel/2568803-wilders-wil-binnen-enkele-weken-alle-grenzen-dicht-voor-asielzoekers-anders-is-pvv-weg). The coalition partners refused to accept this diktat from Wilders, partly because several of his proposals were in conflict with the law, and partly because they were simply impractical to implement.

[46] It is worth noting that Ms. Yeşilgöz came to the Netherlands from Turkey with her mother at the age of seven under a Dutch government family reunification program. Her father, the Kurdish human rights activist Yücel Yeşilgöz, had been forced to flee Turkey three years earlier, in 1981, due to his political activities. Until late in her twenties she was an active member of the Socialist Party and working for the rights of refugees. See: (https://www.vvdamsterdam.nl/nieuws/21034/de-vrije-amsterdammer-dilan-yesilgoz-zegerius; https://grokipedia.com/page/Dilan_Ye%C5%9Filg%C3%B6z.

[47] Out of dissatisfaction with the political climate in their country, large numbers of Americans are now emigrating to the Netherlands as well. In 2025 this already concerns at least 8000 people. See: https://tpo.nl/2025/12/14/recordaantal-amerikanen-emigreert-naar-nederland/.

[48] https://www.unhcr.org/nl/nieuws/waar-niet-waar-het-beperken-van-gezinshereniging-voor-oorlogsvluchtelingen-zal-het.

[49] After his death in 2025, he was remembered in the House of Representatives as follows: “Always neatly dressed in a suit, preferably a blue blazer, and whenever possible with a thick cigar. He had an incredible sense of publicity. Wiegel was a political phenomenon the likes of which the Netherlands had never seen before. That populist voice served the VVD well. Thousands of new members flocked to the party. The party made an electoral breakthrough among the growing middle class.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2024-2025/90.

[50] Between April and June 2025, she regularly appeared on seven different talk shows. A poll conducted at the end of June 2025 showed that JA21 had grown from three to nine seats since the previous month’s poll. Researchers attributed this mainly to the attention Coenradie had received. See: https://www.veriangroup.com/hubfs/zetelpeiling%20juni%202025.pdf

[51] https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2025-09/rapport-politieke-peiling-sept-i-2025.pdf. See p.7-8.

[52] https://ja21.nl/standpunten.

[53] https://fvdinternational.com/article/newsletter-30-may-2024.

[54] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/11/25/senator-fvd-baudet-is-geradicaliseerd-en-hangt-complottheorieen-aan.

[55] An overview offers: Volk, Sabine, Leonie de Jonge and Lars Rensmann. 2023. Populism and the Pandemic: The Politicization of COVID-19 and Cleavage Agency among Populist radical right Parties. Regroup. Rebuilding Governance and Resilience out of the Pandemic. Research Paper No. 7 December 2023.

[56] The Socialist Party, which still held 25 seats in 2006, went from five to three seats, and the pro-European Volt party went from two to one.

[57] https://www.parlement.com/biografie/mrdr-wh-nolens.

[58] Of course, a party also exerts influence when it is not in government: the ruling parties can adopt parts of its program in order to prevent the party from growing. With regard to social democracy, this seems to have worked in the Netherlands. Whether this is also the case with regard to right-wing populist parties is, as said, open to question.

[59] I have described and criticized this development in detail in The Modernization and its Political Consequences (2006), Een Lange Leegte (2009), and Pluralism, Democracy and Political Knowledge (2014).

[60] See: https://hans-blokland.nl/2219/how-postmodernism-advanced-populism-an-inside-story-from-the-netherlands/.

[61] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2025/10/25/de-meeste-kiezers-zweven-nog-slechts-18-procent-is-zeker-van-stem-a4910727; https://nos.nl/artikel/2588734-van-pvv-naar-d66-van-nsc-naar-cda-de-kiezer-was-deze-week-flink-op-drift.

[62] https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2023-12/Kiezersonderzoek%20TK23_v1.0.pdf.

[63] In the 1980s and 1990s, the Lubbers and Kok cabinets almost always remained in office until the scheduled new elections. Since then, cabinets have increasingly fallen prematurely. For example, since 2002 there have been four cabinets that lasted less than a year.

[64] It is noteworthy that Geert Wilders himself is the longest-serving member of parliament, with a tenure of 27 years. Three of his parliamentary colleagues have likewise held seats for approximately 19 years. In this respect, they distinguish themselves markedly from the other members of their faction, who in recent years have primarily attracted attention due to their lack of experience and perceived incompetence (https://www.ad.nl/politiek/nieuwe-tweede-kamer-is-geen-goede-afspiegeling-van-het-land~ad86f7f8/).

[65] https://nltimes.nl/2025/11/08/dutch-parliament-loses-136-years-experience-new-members-sworn.

[66] https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerleden_en_commissies/alle_kamerleden.

[67] Ms. Kaag, fluent in six languages, had first pursued a long career as a diplomat within the United Nations, and subsequently served as member of parliament, parliamentary group leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Finance. Wilders referred to her in parliament and on Twitter with terms such as ‘witch,’ ‘coward,’ ‘arrogant,’ ‘polluter,’ ‘Minister of Palestinian Affairs,’ and ‘giggler.’ Upon her departure from Dutch politics in 2023, Kaag declared that it was above all the personal, intimidating attacks and the insecurity this had caused for herself and her family that led her to the decision to leave politics and the Netherlands (https://www.dutchnews.nl/2023/07/d66-leader-sigrid-kaag-to-quit-politics-citing-impact-on-family/.

[68] https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/mdb_diaeten/1334d-260806.

[69] https://www.wbs.nl/over-de-wbs.

[70] https://www.teldersstichting.nl/contact/over-ons.

[71] https://www.fes.de/.

[72] https://www.kas.de/de/.

[73] The Council rightly points out that parliamentarians do not work for themselves but for the citizens, and that they can only fulfill this role properly with adequate support. https://www.raadopenbaarbestuur.nl/documenten/2021/11/4/ondersteuning-tweede-kamer.

[74] See the last part of The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken. 1951).

[75] There are many examples of this. An important one is that people from the lower social strata vote in large numbers for politicians and parties who want to increase social inequality and cut back on social services. After Brexit and the disastrous consequences for prosperity in the United Kingdom, which have been widely reported in the media, it is difficult to imagine that the person who most strongly advocated Brexit, Nigel Farage, after all his deception and its consequences, is now proudly at the top of the polls with his Reform UK party (The Economist, December 11, 2025). Similarly, it is difficult to swallow that large numbers of Dutch people vote for parties such as Forum for Democracy and the Party for Freedom, which advocate a so-called Nexit.

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The Fragility of Dutch Democracy: Populism, Fragmentation, and Voter Volatility

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The Fragility of Dutch Democracy: Populism, Fragmentation, and Voter Volatility

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